What Information Collected by Israeli Intelligence Reveals About the Iran Talks
Over the years of negotiation, concession after concession from the West
On Nov. 26, 2013, three days after the signing of the interim
agreement (JPOA) between the powers and Iran, the Iranian delegation
returned home to report to their government. According to information
obtained by Israeli intelligence, there was a sense of great
satisfaction in Tehran then over the agreement and confidence that
ultimately Iran would be able to persuade the West to accede to a final
deal favorable to Iran. That final deal, signed in Vienna last week,
seems to justify that confidence. The intelligence—a swath of which I
was given access to in the past month—reveals that the Iranian delegates
told their superiors, including one from the office of the Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, that “our most significant achievement” in
the negotiations was America’s consent to the continued enrichment of
uranium on Iranian territory.
That makes sense. The West’s recognition of Iran’s right to perform
the full nuclear fuel cycle—or enrichment of uranium—was a complete
about-face from America’s declared position prior to and during the
talks. Senior U.S. and European officials who visited Israel immediately
after the negotiations with Iran began in mid 2013 declared, according
to the protocols of these meetings, that because of Iran’s repeated
violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, “Our aim is that in
the final agreement [with Iran] there will be no enrichment at all” on
Iranian territory. Later on, in a speech at the Saban Forum in December
2013, President Barack Obama reiterated that in view of Iran’s behavior,
the United States did not acknowledge that Iran had any right to enrich
fissile material on its soil.
In February 2014, the first crumbling of this commitment was evident,
when the head of the U.S. delegation to the talks with Iran, Wendy
Sherman, told Israeli officials that while the United States would like
Iran to stop enriching uranium altogether, this was “not a realistic”
expectation. Iranian foreign ministry officials, during meetings the
Tehran following the JPOA, reckoned that from the moment the principle
of an Iranian right to enrich uranium was established, it would serve as
the basis for the final agreement. And indeed, the final agreement,
signed earlier this month, confirmed that assessment.
The sources who granted me access to the information collected by
Israel about the Iran talks stressed that it was not obtained through
espionage against the United States. It comes, they said, through
Israeli spying on Iran, or routine contacts between Israeli officials
and representatives of the P5+1 in the talks. The sources showed me only
what they wanted me to see, and in these cases there’s always a danger
of fraud and fabrication. This said, these sources have proved reliable
in the past, and based on my experience with this type of material it
appears to be quite credible. No less important, what emerges from the
classified material obtained by Israel in the course of the negotiations
is largely corroborated by details that have become public since.
In early 2013, the material indicates, Israel learned from its
intelligence sources in Iran that the United States held a secret
dialogue with senior Iranian representatives in Muscat, Oman. Only
toward the end of these talks, in which the Americans persuaded Iran to
enter into diplomatic negotiations regarding its nuclear program, did
Israel receive an official report about them from the U.S. government.
Shortly afterward, the CIA and NSA drastically curtailed its cooperation
with Israel on operations aimed at disrupting the Iranian nuclear
project, operations that had racked up significant successes over the
past decade.
On Nov. 8, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry visited Israel.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu saw him off at Ben Gurion
Airport and told him that Israel had received intelligence that
indicated the United States was ready to sign “a very bad deal” and that
the West’s representatives were gradually retreating from the same
lines in the sand that they had drawn themselves.
Perusal of the material Netanyahu was basing himself on, and more
that has come in since that angry exchange on the tarmac, makes two
conclusions fairly clear: The Western delegates gave up on almost every
one of the critical issues they had themselves resolved not to give in
on, and also that they had distinctly promised Israel they would not do
so.
One of the promises made to Israel was that Iran would not be
permitted to stockpile uranium. Later it was said that only a small
amount would be left in Iran and that anything in excess of that amount
would be transferred to Russia for processing that would render it
unusable for military purposes. In the final agreement, Iran was
permitted to keep 300kgs of enriched uranium; the conversion process
would take place in an Iranian plant (nicknamed “The Junk Factory” by
Israel intelligence). Iran would also be responsible for processing or
selling the huge amount of enriched uranium that is has stockpiled up
until today, some 8 tons.
The case of the secret enrichment facility at Qom (known in Israel as
the Fordo Facility) is another example of concessions to Iran. The
facility was erected in blatant violation of the Non Proliferation
Treaty, and P5+1 delegates solemnly promised Israel at a series of
meetings in late 2013 that it was to be dismantled and its contents
destroyed. In the final agreement, the Iranians were allowed to leave
1,044 centrifuges in place (there are 3,000 now) and to engage in
research and in enrichment of radioisotopes.
At the main enrichment facility at Natanz (or Kashan, the name used
by the Mossad in its reports) the Iranians are to continue operating
5,060 centrifuges of the 19,000 there at present. Early in the
negotiations, the Western representatives demanded that the remaining
centrifuges be destroyed. Later on they retreated from this demand, and
now the Iranians have had to commit only to mothball them. This way,
they will be able to reinstall them at very short notice.
Israeli intelligence points to two plants in Iran’s military industry
that are currently engaged in the development of two new types of
centrifuge: the Teba and Tesa plants, which are working on the IR6 and
the IR8 respectively. The new centrifuges will allow the Iranians to set
up smaller enrichment facilities that are much more difficult to detect
and that shorten the break-out time to a bomb if and when they decide
to dump the agreement.
The Iranians see continued work on advanced centrifuges as very
important. On the other hand they doubt their ability to do so covertly,
without risking exposure and being accused of breaching the agreement.
Thus, Iran’s delegates were instructed to insist on this point.
President Obama said at the Saban Forum that Iran has no need for
advanced centrifuges and his representatives promised Israel several
times that further R&D on them would not be permitted. In the final
agreement Iran is permitted to continue developing the advanced
centrifuges, albeit with certain restrictions which experts of the
Israeli Atomic Energy Committee believe to have only marginal efficacy.
As for the break-out time for the bomb, at the outset of the
negotiations, the Western delegates decided that it would be “at least a
number of years.” Under the final agreement this has been cut down to
one year according to the Americans, and even less than that according
to Israeli nuclear experts.
As the signing of the agreement drew nearer, sets of discussions took
place in Iran, following which its delegates were instructed to insist
on not revealing how far the country had advanced on the military
aspects of its nuclear project. Over the past 15 years, a great deal of
material has been amassed by the International Atomic Energy Agency—some
filed by its own inspectors and some submitted by intelligence
agencies—about Iran’s secret effort to develop the military aspects of
its nuclear program (which the Iranians call by the codenames PHRC,
AMAD, and SPND). The IAEA divides this activity into 12 different areas
(metallurgy, timers, fuses, neutron source, hydrodynamic testing,
warhead adaptation for the Shihab 3 missile, high explosives, and
others) all of which deal with the R&D work that must be done in
order to be able to convert enriched material into an actual atom bomb.
The IAEA demanded concrete answers to a number of questions regarding
Iran’s activities in these spheres. The agency also asked Iran to allow
it to interview 15 Iranian scientists, a list headed by Prof. Mohsen
Fakhrizadeh, whom Mossad nicknamed “The Brain” behind the military
nuclear program. This list has become shorter because six of the 15 have
died as a result of assassinations that the Iranians attribute to
Israel, but access to the other nine has not been given. Neither have
the IAEA’s inspectors been allowed to visit the facilities where the
suspected activities take place. The West originally insisted on these
points, only to retreat and leave them unsolved in the agreement.
In mid-2015 a new idea was brought up in one of the discussions in
Tehran: Iran would agree not to import missiles as long as its own
development and production is not limited. This idea is reflected in the
final agreement as well, in which Iran is allowed to develop and
produce missiles, the means of delivery for nuclear weapons. The longer
the negotiations went on, the longer the list of concession made by the
United States to Iran kept growing, including the right to leave the
heavy water reactor and the heavy water plant at Arak in place and
accepting Iran’s refusal of access to the suspect site.
It is possible to argue about the manner in which Netanyahu chose to
conduct the dispute about the nuclear agreement with Iran, by clashing
head-on and bluntly with the American president. That said, the
intelligence material that he was relying on gives rise to fairly
unambiguous conclusions: that the Western delegates crossed all of the
red lines that they drew themselves and conceded most of what was termed
critical at the outset; and that the Iranians have achieved almost all
of their goals.
Ronen Bergman is a senior correspondent for military and intelligence affairs at Yedioth Ahronoth, and a contributing writer at The New York Times Magazine. He is writing a history of the Mossad.
Labels: Capitulation, Intelligence, Iran, Israel, Nuclear Technology, P5+1, Sanctions, Security, United States