The Middle East: In the Shadow of the Gunmen
by Jonathan Spyer
PJ Media
April 4, 2015

Post "Arab Spring," the Middle East is in chaos. And ready to be devoured by the mullahs of Iran.
In a process of profound importance, five Arab states in the Middle
East have effectively ceased to exist over the last decade. The five
states in question are Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Libya. It is
possible that more will follow.
The causes of their disappearance are not all the same. In two cases
(Iraq, Libya) it was western military intervention which began the
process of collapse. In another case (Lebanon) it is intervention from a
Middle Eastern state (Iran) which is at the root of the definitive
hollowing out of the state.
But in all these cases, the result has been remarkably similar — it
is the ceding of power from strong central authorities to a variety of
political-military organizations, usually but not always organized
around a shared sectarian or ethnic origin. The Middle East today is
overshadowed by this process. We are living in the time of the militias.
Five Arab states in the Middle East have effectively ceased to exist over the last decade.
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Observe: in Syria, the clearest-cut case, the country is now
effectively separated into separated ethnic and sectarian enclaves — an
area dominated by Bashar Assad in the south and west, an area dominated
by the Sunni jihadi Islamic State group in the east, three
non-contiguous Kurdish enclaves across the north, an area under the
domination of al-Qaeda and its allies in the northwest and a small area
in the southwest held jointly by al-Qaeda and a variety of other Sunni
Arab militias supported by the west.
The important point to note here is that the area controlled by Assad
(around 40% of the total area of Syria) does not essentially differ in
its militia-nature from the other areas.
On the contrary, Assad has been able to survive because he is aligned
with the force best designed to successfully exploit the fragmentation
of Arab states and the emergence of militias seeking to impose their
authority on the ruins of the state.
This force is Iran, and more specifically the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and its Qods Force.
This force is a unique body. It exists for the precise purpose of
building proxy paramilitary organizations to serve the Iranian regional
interest. At a time like the present, the possession of such a force is
an enormous advantage.
Assad's large, mainly Sunni Arab conventional army became largely
useless to him in 2011/12. The IRGC stepped in and created for him one
of its own preferred force types. Today, this militia (the National
Defense Forces) along with other Iranian-created or -sponsored militia
forces from neighboring Iraq and Lebanon are largely responsible for
Assad's survival. But he survives as a warlord and militia chief, not as
a "president" or the head of a state.
In Iraq, the country is today separated into three areas, a Kurdish
north, an area in the center controlled by Sunni jihadis and a Shia area
in the south. Again, the Shia south, which is still seen in the west as
the "legitimate" government of Iraq, is in fact an area in which Shia
militias are the key element, operating freely and acting according to
their own will. Often, this will is the product of the desires of the
Qods Force, and its commander General Qassem Suleimani.
In Lebanon, in a notably different process, an Iran-created militia,
Hizballah, acquired the dominant role in the area once ruled by the
state, because the state was a hollow construct long competed over by
rival sectarian militias, and because Iranian and Syrian support enabled
Hizballah to acquire a level of strength which no other homegrown
political-military force could match. It may well be that this is now
changing, as al-Qaeda associated Sunni militias enter the arena.
In Yemen, where the state and central government was also weak, the
Iranian supported militia Ansar Allah (the "Houthis") seized the capital
in January. Sunni elements in the south, including one of the strongest
franchises of al-Qaeda, are fighting against them. A mobilization of
Arab air and sea power is underway to prevent Iran's proxies from
seizing the Bab-el-Mandeb strait. Control of this vital waterway,
between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, would tilt the regional
balance yet further in Iran's favor.
The Iranians, because of their matchless IRGC, are best equipped to make gains from this chaos.
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Finally, in Libya, the western destruction of the Gadaffi regime has
led to the splitting of the country between two rival governments — one
supported by the Egyptians in Tobruk, another backed by Islamist
militias in Tripoli.
Five Arab states, effectively no longer in existence. In all, militia power has replaced ordered government.
What does all this mean for the region? It means that a huge chunk of
the long misgoverned Middle East has exchanged an age of despotic
torpor for an age of chaos. The Iranians, because of their matchless
IRGC, are best equipped to make gains from this.
But nowhere (with the partial exception of tiny Lebanon) have the
Iranians yet succeeded in keeping a country united under the control of
their local proxy. This is not a story of an unstoppable Iranian
advance, like a juggernaut, across the region. Their successes are
notable, but partial in each area of operation. Sunni and Kurdish forces
prevent their complete victory and are likely to continue to do so.
Where will all this end — what will the landscape look like when the storm passes? Impossible to say.
But it may be said with certainty that the shadow of the gunmen is
today hanging over the Middle East, all the way from the Iraq–Iran
border to the Mediterranean coast and from the Gulf of Aden to Libya.
Jonathan Spyer is
Director of the Rubin Center for Research in International Affairs and a
fellow at the Middle East Forum. He is the author of The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict (Continuum, 2011).
Labels: Chaos, Iran, Iraq, Islamism, Lebanon, Libya, Middle East, Syria, Yemen