As the Assad regime is losing its grip over the country, Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah, both active defenders of the regime, are gaining greater freedom of action and trying to change the status quo along Israel's northern border. Both are ideologically committed to the destruction of Israel and are trying to establish a new operations stage against Israel on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights -- something that Assad has resisted for years.
Hezbollah seeks an additional arena from where it can
harm Israel, as conducting operations against the Jewish state from
Lebanon is problematic due to domestic political constraints (primarily
fear of escalation and spillover effects on the Lebanese economy). Iran
has a perennial interest in bleeding Israel. Creating a new threat from
Syria serves this purpose. A new front in Syria will also to enhance its
ability to deter an Israeli attack on its nuclear installations.
A new front in Syria will enhance Iran's ability to deter an Israeli attack on its nuclear installations.
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The helicopter attack
in Syria on senior commanders of Hezbollah and Iran, just beyond the
border with Israel, seems to signal that Jerusalem will not tolerate the
opening of a new front. It is not clear that the Israeli-enunciated red
line will be effective. Hezbollah's response -- attacking an Israeli
military convoy in the border area between the Golan Heights and Lebanon
-- was measured, but indicated a tit for tat modus operandi.
Israel's counter-response was also measured, showing
that the government was reluctant to escalate intentionally and
preferred to contain the violence. This is also what transpires from
Israel's behavior in its war against Hamas during the summer of 2014.
While Israel's cautious response is laudable in many respects, the
limited Israeli military response to Hezbollah's attack does not
enhance deterrence.
Deterrence can be enhanced, however, if Israel makes
preparations for a large-scale operation against Hezbollah. This means
building the necessary ground forces and training for Lebanese
scenarios.
Such a build-up process is not clearly evident so far, and
Hezbollah might deduce that its huge arsenal (over 100,000 missiles)
creates an effective deterrent. As the number of attacks on Israel from
southern Lebanon increased in recent months, the long period of quiet
since 2006 seems more fragile. Perhaps Hezbollah is less afraid to hit
Israeli targets. Deterrence against highly motivated rivals such as
Hezbollah is always temporary and wears off with time. Israeli
restraint is not conducive to restoration of deterrence. Therefore, the
capability to destroy the Hezbollah missile threat is needed for
deterring this radical organization, but also in case Israel finds it
necessary to address such a threat before it attacks the Iranian nuclear
infrastructure.
Deterrence against highly motivated
rivals is always temporary, wearing off with time. Israeli restraint is
not conducive its restoration.
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The attempts to change the security equation in the
north call for a reassessment of Israel's policies toward Assad. If he
is no longer able to resist the desire of Iran and Hezbollah to
perpetrate terrorist acts against Israel from beyond the Golan Heights,
his usefulness for Israel becomes limited. It is true that the civil war
in Syria, where bad guys fight bad guys, is a convenient strategic
development. Moreover, Israel (among other actors) has very limited
influence on the outcome of the bloody struggle, but the survival of the
Assad regime should no longer be a factor in Israel's strategic
calculations.
Actually, the fall of the Assad regime is nowadays an
Israeli interest. The demise of this regime would be a terrible blow to
its regional allies -- Iran and Hezbollah. Damascus, an old ally of
Tehran, is the linchpin of the Shiite crescent. And Iran is the most
dangerous enemy of Israel and the main source for regional instability.
The fall of Assad would also weaken Hezbollah considerably. It would
reduce Hezbollah-Iranian influence in Lebanon and make the Hezbollah
military build-up a more complicated enterprise. A Hezbollah without
Iranian control of Damascus might spare Israel the need to intervene
militarily in Lebanon in order to deal with the missile threat.
An Israeli predisposition to discard
Assad is useful in Jerusalem's relations with Saudi Arabia, which
loathes the Syrian regime.
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If Assad falls, it is not clear what will happen in
Syria, but it is certain that Sunni radical groups will be more
influential and the struggle over controlling parts of the country will
continue. Yet, substate groups are generally less of a security threat
than states.
Assad-led Syria still has a chemical weapons arsenal and
there are reports that it is trying to revive its nuclear weapon
program.
An Israeli predisposition to discard Assad is also
useful in Jerusalem's relations with Saudi Arabia, which loathes the
Assad regime and understands that its fall will curtail the growing
Iranian influence in the Middle East. It is the Iranian threat that
constitutes the strategic glue between the two states.
Of course, the Obama administration does not grasp the
Iranian threat and continues its ill-advised attempts to reach an
agreement with Iran, which allows Tehran to keep its option to build
nuclear weapons. It tries to strengthen Shiite control of Baghdad, seems
to cooperate with Assad against ISIS, which turned out to be a mere
strategic distraction, and accepts the Shiite Houthis' takeover of
Yemen. Therefore, the Syrian-Lebanese nexus could become another issue
of divergence between Jerusalem and Washington. Consequently, the
paralysis of Barack Obama's Middle East policy increasingly becomes an
Israeli concern as well.
Efraim Inbar is director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, a professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University, and a Shillman/Ginsburg fellow at the Middle East Forum.
Labels: Conflict, Defence, Hezbollah, Iran, Islamic State, Islamism, Israel, Security, Syria, United States
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