The State of the Troops

"We don't expect a problem, but I told them if those guns swing around towards us then we'll kill them."
French Officer, Kabul, Afghanistan

An Afghan National Army soldier on a training exercise on the outskirts of Kabul. The ANA has been taking over the fight against insurgents, allowing foreign troops, including Canadians, to withdraw from the war-torn nation. Photo: David Pugliese/Ottawa Citizen

 

So much for trust in the Afghan Army troops being trained in conventional best-practise warfare by French, Canadian and British officers. The guns are mounted on new armoured vehicles whose value is $800,000 each for the dozen being used in an exercise. Officers observing the training on the outskirts of Kabul were there to ensure that training was proceeding well. Despite their unofficial doubts.

Those doubts? That, despite the tens of billions of treasury that Western countries have poured into the project, they question whether the Afghan military will ever be capable of holding its own against the resilient, determined Taliban once the international forces that guide them and often protect them make their final departure at the end of the year.

The show was meant to demonstrate how ably vehicle crews open fire at downrange targets. While foreign journalists were being politely ushered into this trial theatre, French commandos circulated among the officers and the journalists, maintaining a close watch. Each of the commandos held a rifle equipped with a specialized grenade, prepared to fire at the vehicles should the heavily armed turrets point in the direction of the foreigners.

"Insider" attacks continue to a problem. Afghan soldiers and police killed fourteen of their coalition trainers last year; some incidents the result of insurgent infiltration into the ranks. In other instances Afghans have been known to open fire on foreign military because of a 'misunderstanding', where the Afghan felt offended because of perceived slights. The point is to leave the Afghan military trained and equipped as an indigenous force capable of responsibility for their own country's security.

Not that it hasn't been done before, and by the Soviets. When they pulled their troops out in weary resignation in 1989, they left the country with what they were certain by then represented an effective military. The Soviets left a weapons inventory that included fighter jets, attack helicopters, transport planes, artillery, tanks and Scud missile launchers. Many of the Afghan military leaders, and that would include some still serving, had been trained in Moscow.

Despite which that version of a well-equipped and -trained indigenous military simply fell apart with the Soviet withdrawal when subsequent to the collapse of the Soviet Union and hard economic times, the Afghan army was left without Russian funding and supplies. The newly degraded military did little as civil war erupted and the Taliban won the battle to further destroy the country through its relentlessly fanatic administration.

That was then. And this is now. Coalition soldiers began the training soon after arrival in 2001, of a new Afghan army, training an initial force of 38,000. There is a peculiar and very large attrition rate in Afghanistan in its military and police; that initial force dropped to 21,000 by 2005. Afghans, however -- believed coalition military -- were 'natural warriors'. "This is an organization that has positive momentum", Lt.-Col.Wayne Eyre head of the Canadian mentoring team said.

"It's getting better and better and will continue to do so. This army is indicative of the future of Afghanistan. This war is winnable." Sounds good. Some, however, believe differently. That some Afghan National Army soldiers are suspected of cooperating with the Taliban, of stealing equipment, that Afghan police forces had more in common with criminal gangs than law enforcement. Corruption is rampant.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office in 2008 published an assessment of the Afghan security forces training, finding that $16.5-billion spent from 2002 to 2008 on training the ANA and the Afghan National Police resulted in a mere two of the 105 ANA units emerging fully operational, and of 364 units of the Afghan National Police only a dozen were recognized of being capable to lead an operation without NATO support.

American military officers investigating an October 2009 attack on an American outpost near the Pakistan border where eight Americans were killed and 22 injured revealed that the ANA Afghan soldiers hid or remained in their barracks during the intense fighting, frozen with fear. A 2009 firefight was recalled where U.S. and ANA troops were ambushed and the American trainer was unable to persuade the ANA troops to fire back.

Canadian soldiers testified that Afghans were undisciplined, trigger-happy, given to shooting whenever they heard a sound, raising fears among the Canadian training team of friendly-fire incidents. "Currently, the ANA is in its best shape, ready for all kinds of combat operations" assured Lt.-Gen.Mohammad Akram, vice-chief of the general staff of the ANA.

In a 2013 audit the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction warned that about 50 percent of ANA soldiers used drugs. Coalition forces, SIGAR noted, had no way to determine if police and army numbers were accurate, relying on Afghan figures. Attempts by some commanders to claim non-existent soldiers or police in the ranks in order to collect their salaries represented another way to defraud NATO.

It is estimated that currently 25 Afghan soldiers and police are either wounded or killed each week by IEDs, a sharp decline from 2013 when that number was 100 weekly. The Afghan security force now numbers over 340,000, a sizeable force with a sizeable price tag. The bill for fielding and equipping those troop and police officer numbers comes to about $6-billion annually. Afghanistan's GDP is about $19-billion.

Lt.-Gen. Akram, the vice-chief of the ANA feels that international financial support is critical to the maintenance of the security forces those departing NATO troops have trained and are prepared to leave behind. Financial support  must continue from abroad if the military and police are to be sustained.

The insurgency does not appear to have any such sustainability challenges. The Taliban have resurged and now control a number of provinces.

Their plan is to go on a roll with the departure of foreign troops.