Social Alienation

"We have deployed a number of techniques to gather the evidence necessary to obtain the attorney-general consent to lay the two charges that were laid this morning."
"We are confident that our prompt and firm intervention has limited the damage to our collective safety and security."

"In these types of cases, sharing of information may give a foreign entity a tactical, military or competitive advantage by knowing the specifications of vessels responsible for defending Canadian waters and Canadian sovereignty."
RCMP Chief Superintendent Jennifer Strachan

"The pathology of why does somebody betray and take those kinds of risks: lifestyle, financial challenges, mental breakdowns, a disgruntled person trying to get back, a warped sense of political loyalty .... Was he corrupted by somebody that led for him to volunteer something at one point down the road?"
Ray Boisvert, former senior Canadian Security Intelligence Service official

"Mr. Huang did not have security clearance and therefore was not involved in any approvals of AOPS (Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships). He did not have authorized access to information on AOPS or any classified information."
"Because he did not have security clearance, he didn't have any direct access to any classified or controlled information in Lloyd's Register Canada Ltd.'s possession. And I say that very clearly: 'Direct or authorized access'."
Bud Streeter, president, Lloyd's Register Canada

Lloyd's Register, based in the United Kingdom, is a maritime classification group offering risk management services for shipbuilding and allied industries. They evaluate design and construction of large ships. The company is a subcontractor to Irving Shipbuilding Inc. under the country's National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy for the design appraisal of the AOPS for the federal government. Mr. Qing Quentin Huang, 53, a maritime engineer educated in China, worked for Lloyd's Register.

He worked for them, as a structural design appraisal engineer, but he didn't have the security clearance that would authorize him to work on this particular high-profile project for the federal government. He is listed with the Professional Engineers Ontario group, and is licensed to work in Ontario at his very specialized craft and has worked for Lloyd's Register since 2006.

"He is part of a team, but he is not a team leader. His role was to review drawings and approve marine designs", elucidated Mr. Streeter.

But he has been suspended without pay from his job and he will lose his job if he is convicted of the charges brought against him. It would appear from reports that Mr. Huang felt overlooked and his professional credits spurned when he was not given approval to work on the AOPS assignment. Without a security clearance that would not have been feasible, in any event. There seems no suggestion that this Canadian citizen of Chinese origin and training was approached by Chinese agents to deliver secret documents to them.

Of his own initiative he is said to have contacted the Chinese with an offer of his very own. Two days later he found himself under arrest and charged with espionage. The swift response resulted from the RCMP's unwillingness to give him any opportunity to deliver classified material to a foreign government. China is well known to have requested observer status on the UN-mandated Law of the Sea charter apportioning of Arctic rights to those countries claiming geographical proximity rights.

Newly opening Arctic shipping lanes along with extensive geological and natural miner and fossil fuel resources through undersea finds and claims intrigue China for their potential.

Despite his lack of inclusion in the sensitive project requiring security clearance, Mr. Huang is claimed to have been prepared to deliver to the Chinese elements of the multibillion-dollar strategy relating to the patrol ships, frigates, naval auxiliary vessels, scientific research vessels and ice breakers, according to the RCMP. He is said to have had access to details of the new warship designs, notably the federal government's Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship program.

Details that might include the vessels' capabilities and weapons systems included. Certainly not meant for alien or unauthorized scrutiny.  Could pouting offence at lack of inclusion have resulted in this kind of massive betrayal? Will the charges hold up in a court of law? Is there sufficient real evidence beyond mere suspicions, after a three-day investigation, to support the charges?

Canada was embarrassed by the fairly recent espionage and transference of secret materials to Russian agents by military intelligence analyst Jeffrey Delisle who leaked secret documents to the Russian embassy over a prolonged period of time for money exchanged, until his activities were apprehended. the RCMP claim they have no wish to see a repeat, and intended, by their swift apprehension of Mr. Huang to ensure that this would be so.

"The remarks saying that a Canadian-Chinese male providing the Chinese government with confidential information is totally groundless", responded Hong Lei, spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

One of the charges laid against Mr. Huang is that he attempted to pass government secret files to China, not that he had succeeded. "We don't discuss matters of national security. As this matter is before the courts, it would be inappropriate to comment", cautioned Rick Roth, Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird's spokesman.

Such actions, explained Ray Boisvert, the former senior CSIS official, are not necessarily about greed, for it is not at all clear that Mr. Huang's intention in his purported offer was to gain monetary advantage for himself. Often the issue is "about divided loyalties or lack of identity with his society, organization or nation". Sadly, Mr. Huang is said to have lived in his house in Waterloo, Ontario, as a social recluse.