The Whys, Hows and Wherefores

To the casual observer Israel holds a trump card in its vast gas reserves which Vladimir Putin who has personally intervened in Gazprom activities would like to be able to nail down to his advantage. Russia is in fairly good financial shape, but it could be a lot better. Gazprom had a value of $365-billion in 2008 and predictions had it the huge corporation representing Russia's main source of foreign exchange would soar in value to $1-trillion by 2015.

Between 2008 and the present though, Gazprom's value has plunged to less than $100-billion today. President Vladimir Putin is not pleased about this untoward turn of events. He had given his former KGB cronies control and personal financial interests in the monopolistic exporter which had until recently enjoyed a reputation of being one of the world's most profitable companies.

Mr. Putin has enjoyed putting the screws to Europe from time to time, reliant on Russian gas.

From that reliance on Russian gas emanates much of Vladimir Putin's strength and political influence throughout Europe. And the President of all Russia is believed to personally own 4.5% of Gazprom's shares, giving him a personal net worth of about $4-billion. That's pretty rich. He would like greater stability, a return to more profitable sales and pricing, and an absolute lock on distribution.

Turkey had the idea if building a direct route gas pipeline to Europe. That fell through when Gazprom built an entirely redundant rival pipeline. And President Putin has proudly burnished his environmental credentials by siding with protests against fracking to extract Europe's potential shale gas reserves, because it represented irresponsible anti-green activities. Neatly protecting his monopoly.

And then he turned his opportunistic acquisitive eye to the vast reserves identified in the eastern Mediterranean's Levant Basin, whose obvious delivery would be to Europe. Motivating Mr. Putin to nudge out his competitors and consolidate his monopolistic powers over Europe's gas needs, by signing a contract with Israel to deliver the product from its huge Tamar gas field.

The 20-year deal gives Gazprom exclusive seller rights over the vast reserves. And Gazprom is lining up to sign a similar contract with Israel for distribution rights for its even larger Leviathan gas field. Then on to Cyprus for similar contract conclusions, and Syria and Lebanon to follow. Giving Russia the monopolistic rights it so craves, enabling it to control everything, including delivery price.

All this being so, it is somewhat surprising that Israel isn't using the potential to deny Gazprom rights over its distribution for the Leviathan field. In return, say, for a rock-solid guarantee that Russia will not undertake activities that prove inimical to the existence of the Jewish State. For example, Russia's advanced-technology munitions contracts with Syria.

Those accurate, deadly S-300 air-defence missiles that Syrian military technicians, with expert training by Russian technicians will enable Syria to shoot down IDF warplanes that fly over Syrian airspace in a determined bid to protect Israel from its mortal enemies. Not only, with possession of those missiles, might Syria defend itself from Israeli air attacks like the previous two that took out advanced weaponry and a military research lab, but also the attack that destroyed its nuclear site.

And any future plans by Israel to launch air attacks against Iranian nuclear sites to forestall that country from achieving its goal of producing nuclear weapons to enable it to launch devastating strikes against Israel, as it has repeatedly warned is its intention, would be irremediably compromised by the presence of those S-300 advanced missiles.

Presumably, when Israeli Prime Minister visited Putin at Sochi after Putin tore a strip off Netanyahu in Shanghai, for destroying a previous Russian-procured air defence missile delivery that very topic might have been diplomatically, but not tentatively touched upon.

Moscow is clearly playing a cat-and-mouse game with Israel and the United States. On the one hand it claims to have committed to supplying the Syrian regime with the more advanced missiles, which will require at least a six-month technical-tutelage in their use before they can become operative, and on the other hand, it declares through another country's news media that it has entertained second thoughts, after all, and decided to refrain.

A position that the Kremlin has never officially announced.

Russia is determined to keep the Alawite regime of President Bashar al Assad intact. If Moscow could be assured that the rebels -- should they gain the upper hand and cause Assad to flee -- might be agreeable to a similar round of agreements with Russia including gas distribution, hosting Russia's naval fleet, and remaining a client for munitions, it might have other opinions of the opposition. But obviously Mr. Putin subscribes to the theory of a bird in hand.

Moscow may determine in the end that it has no real need to supply the S-300 long-range missiles to Syria, as long as Israel can be coerced by the threat of their supply to agree with Putin's demand that it "refrain from further air attacks on Syria". Israel finds itself in the hardest of hard places. Refrain, and allow Syria to share the advanced weapons technology and the chemical agents it already has, with its implacable adversary Hezbollah, itself dedicated to destroying Israel.

Or continue to defy Russia, and in the process deny it the second gas distribution contract it is so eager to acquire to consolidate its dominant monopoly on European gas distribution. A defiance that will allow it to continue its goal of self-protection from the deadly axis of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah with their plans for the future of mounting a three-pronged, distracting attack on the tiny but powerful state with a view to obliterating it with 'conventional' weapons and sheer force of numbers.

This is a situation whose complexity defies mere conundrum.

And who really knows whether or not the missiles in question are already in place as some Russian officials have suggested. Some claim partial fulfillment of the contract, others that the shipments were fully completed. And the rest is simply intrigue to foment uncertainty. According to the Nezavisimaya Gazeta in its May 16 publication ostensibly quoting Russian military-diplomatic sources: "All four S-300 batteries sold under a 2010 contract are already on Syrian territory."

Or not?

Moscow playing coy, playing for time, playing for advantage...?