The Bottom Line

"I've seen tremendous improvement over the last couple of years and I continue to see it. I think the counter-insurgency strategy may have been employed a little later than we would have liked, but in essence I think it's moved this country in the right direction.
"The bottom line is that I actually think, for the most part, the situation continues to improve."
Afghanistan has been a "painful and productive mission" for the Canadian military.
Maj.-Gen.Dean Milner, senior Canadian officer in Afghanistan

Maj.-Gen. Milner points out that the size of Afghanistan's security forces has seen an increase from 192,000 members in 2009 to the current force size of 345,000. Afghan security was so ill-paid, its conscripts so slight in their commitment to their country's military and police forces that they would simply spontaneously take their leave, diminishing the numbers of reliable personnel. Their professional skills were lacking; they had no concept of loyalty to the group they formed part of.

"NATO is no longer in the lead", said Maj.-Gen.Milner. "We don't even plan these operations". Because of the beefed-up security forces numbers and their increased professionalism, their ability to take charge, to react in a professional manner, fewer insurgent attacks have taken place, he says. And when there is a need to respond, it is the Afghan forces not western militaries that do so, and provide the required security.

That's one optimistic perspective. There are others, far less sunny and appreciative of the advances that the Canadian major-general speaks so fondly of. The former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, and a commanding general of forces in the country from 2005 to 2007, feels otherwise than laudatory appreciation for the success of the counter-insurgency doctrine, known as COIN.

And his opinion has been joined by West Point professor Col. Isaiah Wilson III who knows all about the U.S. Afghan strategy because he helped work on it. He has expressed his opinion of the critical affect of COIN, as a failure, as it was practised both in Iraq and Afghanistan. The doctrine of counter-insurgency was adopted as a strategy to win 'hearts and minds' and thus to isolate the Taliban by securing the trust of the Afghan people.

The U.S., Canada and other NATO partners stationed in Afghanistan turned their attention to the protection of civilian populations, the elimination of insurgent leaders and to focus on the need to establish a legitimate government capable of and engaged in delivering needed services to its people. "In short, COIN failed in Afghanistan", wrote Mr. Eikenberry.

"The typical 21-year-old marine is hard-pressed to win the heart and mind of his mother-in-law; can he really be expected to do the same with an ethnocentric Pashtun tribal leader?" Mr. Eikenberry asked provocatively. But making his point, since 21-year-olds are not generally known for their skills in psychology and culture-adaptation, particularly when plopped centrally within an alien culture.

The COIN principles revolved around the protection of local populations, winning their trust, delivering services. "But what about criminal narcotraffickers, venal local police chiefs, or predatory government officials?" asked Eikenberry. And what about the oppression of women in a backward culture, of the rape of young boys and girls, and the degradation of women and children forced into a way of life that diminished their humanity?

He also pointed out that most Western military personnel hadn't the language skills to communicate with those whose lives they were supposed to impact positively, nor did they have more than a purely passing knowledge of Afghan culture. And then there is the additional little factoid that Afghanistan is almost wholly reliant on financial support from the international community where donors have paid for 90% of the country's total public expenditures, including security forces.

And the very certain knowledge that much of that financial support has been skimmed off to enhance the bottom line of government officials, military and police brass, and various types of authority figures. Operation Attention has cost the Canadian taxpayer $500-million for a training mission of Afghan security forces by Canadian soldiers, post-2011 pullout of most of the thousand-plus members of the Canadian military.

But Maj.-Gen. Milner says that "It gives me comfort to tell you today that the areas in Kandahar province where so many of our Canadian men and women fought against a determined insurgency have improved significantly in terms of security and stability as a result of our efforts and sacrifice".

Without a doubt it will give him no comfort whatever once the foreign pullout has been completed in 2014, and the Taliban return to assume their former position of power, as seems inevitable. Should that occur, however, the need to continue funding an Afghanistan remaining in control of its current President Hamid Karzai, will become utterly moot.

A Canadian Army soldier, mentoring the Afghan National Army, watches a training session of Afghan National Army soldiers at the Kabul Military Training Center in Afghanistan last year. Canadian trainers are scheduled to complete their mission early next year. (Anja Niedringhaus/AP Photo)