When We Leave...

"When we leave, I am worried for them.  I am worried that someone else will take over or that some of the ANA will turn, but I am hoping that the work we are doing will counter that, and I hope that we are training ethical leaders who will remain patriotic for Afghanistan instead of for themselves."
Lieutenant Alex Buck

It's not pleasant, thinking all one's work is for naught. Contemplating the inevitable, and the inevitable is drawing ever closer.  It is even possible that international troops with ISAF and NATO may leave Afghanistan before the stated date of 2014.  Morale among the international troops has been shaken. 

The very people whom they have risked their lives for, and continue to do, are among those whom they can no longer trust.

Too many Afghan police and members of the military have suddenly turned against their mentors.  Without warning, after sharing a training mission, a meal, rising to depart, British and American soldiers have been shot at point blank range.  Some of these assassinations have been carried out by Afghans suspected of being Taliban, dressed in Afghan military fatigues.

On the other hand, recruits to the Afghan military are known to abandon their posts, some simply to return home, others to join the Taliban where they are assured of a superior rate of compensation.  Commitment normally assumed within a national army appears to be rather unreliable.  There seems to be a lack of moral fibre. 

Self-interest is more consuming than national interest.

Russia has looked on askance at the incursion of NATO forces in Afghanistan, a country that the Soviets attempted to tame in their turn, fearful of fundamental Islamism.  Not only just before NATO did, but in the historical past.  It was called The Great Game.  Britain and Russia vying with one another for the opportunities inherent in controlling access to the east through control and occupation of Afghanistan. 

From Alexander the Great, to the Mongol Invasion onward to modern history, Afghanistan has defeated in the end, all the plans of its would-be occupiers.  NATO forces are training Afghans in modern warfare methodology.  But Afghans have themselves perfected their own guerrilla tactics in clever imitation of what they deem their oppressors to use.  Slow, steady, indefatigable, sowing terror.

A regular army doesn't have the flexibility of a guerrilla militia.  Not its manoeuvrability, nor its fervour, not even its commitment.  The guerrillas represent the underdog, and that passion to surmount difficulties using any means at their disposal gives them an advantage, one enhanced by their ability to simply melt into the landscape, into mountain regions they know well, dragging down the attempts of a military machine to follow.

It is alarming to the international community that those whom they attempt to train and to arm against their common enemy turn against their attempts.  Not so mysterious, however, since they are far closer in culture, language, religion and social heritage to the enemy than they are to the aliens who have invaded their country claiming to wish to help them.  Although the bulk of Afghan recruits are safely enough trusted, they cannot be, since they are tainted by the narrow majority that are not.

Now, there is always one member of each ISAF force tasked to teach Afghan recruits, who stands armed overseeing interactions between international troops and their Afghan allies.  There is no longer unquestioned trust, but careful wariness, infecting all relationships, affecting trust and communication to create a gulf that nothing now can breach.

"I pat down every ANA who comes through the gate regardless of rank, regardless of whether they like it or not", explained U.S. Specialist Thomas Wood, guarding the gate between Camp Apache and the Afghan National Army's Camp Eagle, located alongside the American camp.  Unsurprisingly, this is taken as an insult, an assault against the integrity of those being searched. 

Errors in judgement can be too costly, however, and the searches continue.

As though there weren't more than enough problems in attempting to adequately train Afghan recruits.  Who mostly cannot read, have no idea about arithmetic, and have little notion of integrity and responsibility.  Rates of abandonment of position run as high as 20%.  The Afghan National Army is deficient in training, its medical practise is poor, evacuation (of wounded) even worse.

Remedying all these lapses in efficiency and professionalism is tough.  Place a layer of mistrust over that and fear of the unexpected and that's a formula for dysfunction.  It takes roughly nine weeks on a fast-track training by Canadians mentoring Afghan instructors.  Forming, equipping, training new battalions.  Building a military training university, Afghan style, on the quick.  Training recruits to read maps and basic manuals.

And the blue on green attacks remain a formidable problem, when Afghan police or army recruits suddenly abandon the fiction of trust and security.  "There's no doubt insider attacks have undermined trust and confidence, absolutely.  It's safe to say that a significant part of the insider attacks are due to Taliban tactics", said NATO secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

And, so?  Where to go from there?