Forget The Corruption

"I am not saying that corruption is not important.  This is perhaps the most sinister enemy from within Afghanistan's democracy and Afghanistan's state building process.  What I'm saying is it's more effective for us to be able to do it."  Jaweed Ludin, Afghanistan's Deputy Foreign Minister

What, in fact, he is saying, is nothing new.  President Karzai has long been critical of the fact that international aid to Afghanistan has not gone directly to him and his council.  The fact that corruption is endemic, traditional and a way of life in Afghanistan should not be an impediment, as far as he is concerned, to entrusting the billions of humanitarian aid funding that streams into the country.

Instead of funding foreign entities, international humanitarian aid groups, who then filter the funding in consultation with the government, Hamid Karzai feels far more could be accomplished, more effectively, given directly to him to allocate.  How this makes sense to anyone but himself is questionable, but international donors aren't buying it, and never have.

Kabul, Jawed Ludin insists, will get around to making an anti-corruption effort.  After all, the people of Afghanistan loathe their current government for many reasons, one of which is the established level of corruption.  Other reasons are the perceived and actual ineptness of government at providing services and security to its people, outside of Kabul.

Possibly Mr. Karzai feels he would garner greater public respect if he were in charge of foreign-funded money transfers.  Possibly, he's right.  Possibly it won't happen, because the international community feels enough of its funding goes to graft and corruption and will continue to do its utmost to limit it as much as is feasibly possible.

But Mr. Ludin (formerly Ambassador to Canada) is critical of foreign investors; their focus on graft in his country has been "unhelpful".  At the very same time as international spending has managed to inflate the cost of the decade-long war and reconstruction.  Inevitably, graft and corruption in a corruption-prone society has its reflection in the relations between contractors in that society and contractees of the foreign community.

Afghans themselves chafe against official corruption and the bribes extracted from them for every conceivable interaction and transaction conducted within the country.  Afghanistan's rank as one of the most corrupt countries in the world is not for nothing.  The country is so aid-reliant it would simply collapse into complete dysfunction from its current semi-dysfunctional state if foreign investment in aid were to be removed.

Hamid Karzai's half-brother, along with members of his parliament were involved when the country's Kabul Bank was hollowed out, its liquidity vanished after senior executives had 'lost' $300-million in failed real estate investments.  Still, insists Deputy Foreign Minister Jawed Ludin, control of spending should become more "indigenized".

As far as he, the main architect of Afghan foreign policy is concerned, the United States government - from whom President Karzai expects $2-billion annually, for a total of $4.2-billion from the entire international community in annual support - should consider its financial commitment as an investment in the future; the "big bargain".

That bargain is inextricably wound up in the premise that Afghanistan would remain a democratic, strategic U.S. ally in that impossibly turbulent part of the world.  Much as the United States depends upon Pakistan as its focal ally in its 'war on terror', by funding its military and secret service to the tune of $2-billion annually.  With all the intrigue and back-stabbing inherent in that association.


"My advice", he says serenely, "is that they should just leave the rest to Afghans themselves to sort out."