Security in Afghanistan

Well, what about security in Afghanistan? It's what ISAF and NATO have been working so diligently to bring about, after all. Ten years in the making; the first year dedicated to ousting the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the following to ensuring they did not return, and to establishing civil infrastructure in a war-torn country sorely lacking them. But the Taliban did return, time after time, re-occupying territory they had been evacuated from, and in greater numbers on each return.

There was and remains, little security for Afghan citizens; neither in the far-flung provincial areas living in remote villages, or in the cities, including the capital. Violence slowly flared up again, and kept international forces alert to the potential of being blown up by a wider use of improvised explosive devices which the Taliban became increasingly adept in planting on public roads.

The international forces and accompanying humanitarian NGOs did their best to attain a semblance of normalcy for Afghans. Although it's debatable what 'normal' represents in that country. What it represents, for the most part, in a backward society where tribal Islam holds that women should be neither seen nor heard, and girl children need not be educated, while boys were given only Koranic instruction, is moot.

But the foreign presence built schools and medical centres, encouraged women to become educated, to take employment, to be confident and proud of themselves. And a veneer of civility began to present itself, with foreign instructors assisting in the areas of law, jurisprudence, civil authority and administration, health services, education, and business opportunities.

In a country where young girls are still consigned to arranged marriages, where schools continue to be blown up, and acid thrown in the faces of schoolgirls. And where suicide bombers are increasingly infiltrating areas considered to be well defended from attack. And IEDs still kill Afghan civilians. Where devout Islamists hungry to defeat the 'foreign occupiers' and retake the country, explode munitions in Mosques.

As foreign countries plan to remove their troops it became clear that the Afghan National Army troops and the national police would have to perform those tasks that would keep their country free of Taliban rule. Canada, pulling out its military, left hundreds behind to train the Afghan military and police, as has done many other countries. Billions of dollars have been spent by the international community in attempting to build civil infrastructure, and protecting the nation.

Now, even while the numbers of Afghan recruits are slowly increasing in number, with fewer members of the military abandoning their posts, all indications are that Afghan military units, rather than becoming more self-confident and capable of performing on their own authority and professionalism, have become less capable, less confident. They remain highly reliant on the leadership of foreign troops.

The benchmarks that the foreign militaries, the humanitarian-tasked NGOs and international civil volunteers set for themselves have in some measure been met. Building schools, training teachers, facilitating cross-border communication between Afghanistan and Pakistan, building infrastructure projects, have all been recognized as having been performed well. What will become of them is a huge question, once the international community departs.

But the Afghan National Army seems incapable of standing on its own. They are decreasingly capable of leading security operations; to date leading fewer than 10% of major military operations in Kandahar province alone, the birthplace of the Taliban. Canada alone has spent $12-billion for its presence in Afghanistan. Canadian troops are set to fully depart by tomorrow.

Security in Afghanistan?