Smoking Deal

HMCS Chicoutimi

This exchange with Great Britain, lots of treasury for four submarines that Britain discarded, in favour of acquiring nuclear subs for themselves, did no great favours for Canada. In the British naval yards where the submarines were temporarily mothballed until they could find a country eager enough and casual enough about what they would really be procuring, it would appear that even the most basic curatorial procedures weren't followed.

When Canadian submariners took possession of the first of the Victoria-class ships to bring it to Canadian waters in 2004, a fire broke out in the electrical equipment room of HMCS Chicoutimi which caused extensive cabling damage. Nine crew members of the vessel suffered smoke inhalation, three crew transferred by helicopter to a hospital in Ireland, and Lieut.Chris Saunders, 32, died en route. Not a very auspicious start to the refurbishing of a new Canadian fleet.

HMCS Victoria

The initial purchase agreement was a total of $750-million, the subs to be delivered between 2000 and 2004. When Canada discovered a few problems; key welds to be redone, one hull dent, repaired, diesel exhaust valves to be replaced. And careless in the extreme - necessitating unanticipated repairs - the British had stored the submarines with water in their fuel tanks. The deep refit was Canada's to look after; the deal done, the purchaser to pay the rest of the freight.

As happens when a refit and refurbishment of such complex vessels is undertaken, including ensuring compatibility with Canada's own store of Mk48 torpedoes, rather than using Britain's own designs which the ships had originally been built for, the work costs skyrocketed to outdistance the original procurement cost. The costs involved and the inevitable, drawn-out delays meant that training on the use of the subs also had to be delayed.

The upshot was that Canada didn't have a submarine fleet after all - not one that could be relied upon.

Victoria Class And now that time has passed and we're in 2011, Canada still doesn't have operational submarine capability. All of the submarines have been set aside for further desperately required maintenance and repair issues. HMCS Windsor which Canada took possession of in 2001 has been at sea for a grand total of 332 days. HMCS Corner Brook was damaged when it hit sea bottom in B.C. waters.

HMCS Chicoutimi still hasn't been made completely sea-worthy in the wake of that dismal 2004 fire that caused one sailor's death. HMCS Victoria was expected to be ready to return to active duty in 2012, as was HMCS Windsor. The subs' "watertight integrity and the functionality of other key systems" are still to be assessed. Imagine the crews of the submarines, being informed - as they should be - that the reliability of the subs' sea-worthy sustainability are not yet confirmed.

These are well-trained professionals accustomed to spending a good portion of their working life at sea, in a submersible that they must rely upon as water-tight and fully mechanically operational; their lives are at stake. Let alone the fact that the Canadian Naval Command would ideally like to have a dependable fleet on call for duty. The innumerable problems in mechanical and design and materials integrity have ensured that plans to proceed and make use of the fleet have had to be put on hold.

"The introduction of the Victoria Class has been fraught with many issues and faced a number of setbacks", according to a May 2009 briefing paper. Now there's an understatement of magnificent proportions. Reports issued in July cited additional documents noting that the subs have been restricted to the depths they can achieve because of rust problems. When metal hits water that kind of chemical reaction does occur, and aren't new space-age treatments and materials supposed to account for that eventuality? Additional repair costs unknown at the present time.

But wait - HMCS Corner Brook is expected to be ready for testing, trials and personnel training once it has undergone its scheduled maintenance regime, titled the Extended Docking Work Period - by at least 2016.