The Taliban Master Plan

A member of Taliban forces (L) sits on a an armoured vehicle outside Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan August 16, 2021. REUTERS/Stringer

"[We had] direct talks with the security forces there, and also through mediation of tribal elders and religious scholars. All over Afghanistan, not in a particular province or a particular geographic location."

"Our security chiefs and seniors of other commissions, they are all from ethnicities residing there. That is why they were able to take all those provinces' districts through negotiations and talks."

"It's not the same situation as in the past."

Suhail Shaheen, Doha-based Taliban spokesman

 

"We have mujahedeen and fighters in every area."

"We have Panjshiri mujehedeen in Panjshir province, Balkhi mujahedeen in Balk province, Kandahari mujahedeen in Kandar province." 

Waheedullah Hashimi, senior Taliban commander

Even the Taliban themselves were surprised at the ease with which one provincial capital after another fell easily to their advance, in some instances with no resistance whatever. They had prepared themselves for a more difficult struggle in their plan to re-take control of the country they formed the government in, from 1996 to 2001. But unlike the 'foreign invaders' they knew the country, its culture, its ethnic and tribal divisions and they resolved to do things differently this second time around, to change their essence from a purely Pashtun presence to a more inclusive collective, operated by Pashtuns.

"The Taliban didn't want to fight battles."

"Tey wanted instead to induce a political collapse."

Asfandyar Mir, security analyst for South Asia, Stanford University

"It doesn't mean these Afghan leaders surrendering to us had changed or become pious, it's because there were no more dollars."

"They surrendered like goats and sheep."

Taliban commander, Ghazni province

It helped, immeasurably that the U.S. was amenable to recognizing the Taliban to the extent that they were willing to negotiate with Taliban representatives in Qatar, entirely excluding their 'allies', the government of Afghanistan in the process. An act that delivered the message that the government was irrelevant to the process of establishing 'peace', while the U.S. could negotiate a troop departure with the Taliban terrorist group, a joyous advance notice that the Islamist fundamentalists could proceed with their plan of ousting the government and occupy the country completely.

 

With the certainty of the departure's imminence, the signal was given for the Taliban to proceed with their plan, giving lip service to plans to consult with the Afghan government in a presumed shared plan for peace and governance, as the U.S. naively willed itself to believe would be imminent, and peace would reign with conciliation between the two. Above all, the Americans could abscond in the night without alerting the Afghan government, with a clear conscience; they had done everything they could to avert further conflict. 

After all, they trained the national police and military to U.S. military standards. They provided updated technologically advanced war machinery; planes, helicopters, tanks, trucks, weapons; the rest was up to the Afghan government. Which had never been weaned away from U.S. cash installments and air power shielding their military in conflicts with the Taliban. In the meanwhile, the Taliban conducted disparate raids, dispatched suicide bombers, attacked soldiers and police, killing at random, inspiring fear in the minds of Afghans, their police, the military.

When the U.S. forces were withdrawn they took with them confidence that had been instilled in the Afghan government and its security forces that they would always be protected by the presence of the U.S. and its allied international forces in the interests of a stable Afghanistan where the institutions of democracy and equality and an advanced economy would be assured. Disbelief set in when the props were removed and suddenly Afghanistan found itself abandoned and vulnerable, surrendering to fate. And the Taliban is now well and truly equipped, courtesy of the U.S. taxpayer and a craven administration.

 

The Congressional watchdog body appointed to monitor the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, SIGAR, reported in July that in some Afghan areas their forces exerted a level of resistance "while in others they surrendered or fled in disorder", and that is the action/reaction-description of the national Afghan forces the world has become familiar with. Panic sets in when the mainstays of protection have been removed and with it, confidence that one can survive the onslaught. 

The Taliban financed their return to power through opium and illegal mining, after their 2001 ouster. They remained minimally active in annual spring forays against foreign troops, but never instigating any large-scale encounters, relying on guerrilla tactics and IEDs to deliver the message they were still actively engaged, while they continued to build up their forces with the caution that U.S. air power was to be avoided. Bit by bit they assumed control of further reaches of Afghanistan, provincial areas where they formed shadow governments.

And then the mostly ethnic Pashtun Taliban began courting local support and to persuade Tajiks, Uzbeks and other minorities that it would be in their interests to join them. Eventually a united front arose between the political leadership and member-fighters across the country. While the Biden administration was busy signing its 'peace' accord ahead of withdrawal, its Defense Intelligence Agency spoke of clear indications the Taliban was stepping up attacks on district centres, cutting off key highways and attacking provincial cities.

A member of Taliban forces inspects the area outside Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan August 16, 2021. REUTERS/Stringer

 

Targeted assassinations of Afghan security personnel, as well as pilots began "with the goal of weakening ... morale and undermining public trust in the government" read the State Department's lead inspector general's July report. Once the Taliban secured border posts cutting off revenue sources for government and support from local clans who extended loyalty to the government in exchange for a share of customs levies, the strategy for success was well under way.