Internet, Intelligence, Infrastructure Security

"I have always been more concerned about the possibility of network manipulation."
"You don't even have to actually take that step, if you control the network. The knowledge that you can is power in itself."
"How free would we really be in our choices with respect to protecting human rights and other issues if we know that the functioning of crucial parts of our economy depends on the good will of an external power?"
Norbert Rottgen, chairman, foreign affairs committee, German Parliament

"[Canada would stand to jeopardize its access to U.S. intelligence should it fail to recognize the] importance of a secure and reliable next-generation telecommunications infrastructure] in choosing to allow Huawei as a telecommunications partner in its 5G upgrade, imperilling the defense partnership between the U.S. and itself]."
Robert Blair, U.S. special representative for international  telecom policy

The issue is security and espionage and it is also competitive advantage and Beijing's forward drive using all means and methods at its disposal to exert dominance in global communications in its march toward establishing itself as the great world power nudging the currently only great world power to move over and perhaps move down a notch. That great world power is only too aware of that long-range plan in competing for influence and acknowledgement as a growing titan of commerce, trade, finance and military might.

And the United States of America has no intention whatever of accommodating the aspirations of China, more than content to reign on an ongoing basis is the sole world power with the clout in every dimension of exerting that power as a force for world order and security, working in tandem with allies. Allies that have, with the Trump administration, become wary and uncertain of the reliability of their dependence on that world power. Beijing has gone out of its way to ingratiate itself with many countries of the world through an extension of its influence by buying goodwill and trust.

Its Belt and Road initiative has indebted parts of Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East with huge, costly public infrastructure. Investments that strengthen bonds and dependence, increasing China's capacity in trade and production and delivery, while leaving the countries gifted with new bridges, dams and roads with the obligation to repay loans they may not be able to afford. Add the Confucius cultural institutions that Beijing has installed in foreign academic institutions and the level of influence balloons.

Officials in the U.S. have warned of the dangers inherent in allowing Huawei into networks that control communications and major national infrastructure, giving Beijing the opportunity to spy on, even turn off networks should matters go awry. These severe risks to national and international security and the networks of trust built between nations are real, not remote. To protect its own interests, the U.S. is warning its allies that any countries linking their 5G upgrades to Huawei will no longer share intelligence.

Britain has ignored that warning, and will contract with Huawei for its 5G upgrade. Germany appears to be on the cusp of doing the same. Leading the United States to refuse access to American technology, cutting Huawei off from the U.S.-designed-and-produced vital elements it requires. What is at stake is huge; everything from the control of communications, critical infrastructure and the "Internet of things": devices that control factories, autonomous vehicles and the operations of military bases.

The restriction of sales of microchips, artificial intelligence, robotics and software is one element of response to the situation, leaving Huawei to resort to a thriving black market whereby it will continue to access such products despite a ban on selling to Huawei. Another critical issue is preventing companies from sharing research or teaming up with Chinese companies; tellingly such 'cooperation' allowing foreign firms to enter the Chinese market comes with a demand that foreign producers must share their secret data and technologies with their Chinese links.

The alternative to Huawei is there, notably through Nokia and Ericsson, the two European companies that continue to deploy more 5G networks than Huawei, but whose prices are considerably higher making them less attractive in comparison to Huawei's attractively low-by-comparison pricing. Countries in Europe must decide to either deny a vital intelligence ally, or choose to alienate a critical trading partner.

Ironically, Germany's intelligence chiefs side with the American assessment of national security dangers inherent in using Huawei's networks, but its political elite is still likely to choose Huawei. Since both Germany and Britain are among the U.S.'s staunchest allies and intelligence-sharers, the situation is complex and dangerous. Australia has banned Huawei as has New Zealand, and Japan appears to have done so as well, while Poland may, as may Italy.

An approach allowing more companies to challenge Huawei is in the works by a group of wireless carriers prepared to press for a common architecture for software and hardware operating 5G networks. An arrangement of this nature would see smaller companies making individual parts of networking equipment interacting with one another, and thus breaking Huawei's market dominance.

A worker inspects an antenna at the Huawei village in Donnguan, China. Photograph: Huawei