Baathist ISIS

"ISIL, as an organization, would not exist without former Baathists."
Sajad Jiyad, Iraq analyst, al-Bayan Center for Studies & Planning, Baghdad

"The people in charge of military operations in [ISIL] were the best officers in the former Iraqi army, and that is why [ISIL] beats us in intelligence and on the battlefield."
Brig.Gen.Hassan Dulaimi, former Saddam military intelligence officer

"It's less important in terms of the contribution to manpower, or sheer heft or size, and more important in terms of the specific skills, connections, linkages and technical expertise that the Baathists bring to the table."
"[ISIL has used intelligence expertise to] systematically profile, manipulate and then dominate population centres by assessing the weak points of the population, and assessing potential collaborators. That's the kind of thing professional intelligence officers in authoritarian states, specifically in psychopathic authoritarian states like Saddam Hussein's, are well trained to do."
Shashank Joshi, senior research fellow, Royal United Services Institute

This is the short-sightedness of interference coming home to roost. First of all, that a foreign intervention could solve the problem of removing a bloody tyrant and all would be well, in the cesspool of the Middle East. When Saddam Hussein's removal set free a cyclone of hatred to ravish a population comprised of sectarian animosities of ancient lineage in a tribal atmosphere of punishing revenge and limitless cruelty.

There are some who feel that the cruelest and most barbaric populations among Arabs exist in Iraq and Syria, although Pakistan and Afghanistan must come in fairly close. In Syria there is the ongoing prospect of ever greater numbers of Sunni Syrians being barrel-bombed and helicopter-gunship-strafed by their own government. In Iraq there is the ongoing reality of a suspicious hatred so deeply entrenched that the Shiite-led government will do nothing to empower Sunni tribes who might be relied upon to reject the Islamic State jihadist movement.

But as far as poor reckoning and lack of diligence to outcomes is concerned they are not alone. It was the United States' administration which decided to invade Iraq and remove all weapons of mass destruction along with its dictator Saddam Hussein; they were unable to achieve the first since there were no weapons of mass destruction, but succeeded in the second, to the detriment of Iraqi stability, unleashing a deadly hostility that the tyrant had kept tamped down through terrorizing his people.

The decision to entirely disband the Iraqi military and send all Baathists packing; they could take no government positions, nor be used in the military, would, by the very nature of human beings leave them free to pursue other means by which to once again sue for power. The tripartite government base urged on Iraq by the U.S. with Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds sharing administrative governance of the country lasted as long as the Americans were present in Iraq, then abruptly dissolved.

Before then, when Sunni tribal leaders agreed to an American proposal to aid in battling the presence of al-Qaeda in Iraq, they became a force to be reckoned with, fighting alongside the U.S. military, trained and provisioned and armed by the U.S. Persuading the Shia-led government to absorb them into the Iraq military led nowhere. The result should have been predictable, but vision was clouded by an eagerness on the part of America to leave the hellhole of Iraq, and an  unwillingness on the part of Shiites in authority to give any quarter to Iraqi Sunnis.

Big surprise now that former Baathist members of the Iraqi Armed Forces are integrally involved in leading Islamic State militias? That their expertise in logistics, in intelligence and battlefield strategy has been a boon to the Sunni terrorists? Hardly, other than for an absent imagination. After all, ten years of unremitting bloodshed and horror in the conflict between Iraq and Iran provided ample experience; each country skilled in killing, leading to a draw.

Sources: Soufan Group, staff reports | The Washington Post April 4