Implausible Denial

"The notion that Iran is undeterrable — it’s simply not the case. And so for us to say, ‘Let’s try’ — understanding that we’re preserving all our options, that we’re not naïve — but if in fact we can resolve these issues diplomatically, we are more likely to be safe, more likely to be secure, in a better position to protect our allies, and who knows? Iran may change. If it doesn’t, our deterrence capabilities, our military superiority stays in place. ... We’re not relinquishing our capacity to defend ourselves or our allies. In that situation, why wouldn’t we test it?"
"Well, what I’d say to them [Israelis] is this: 'You have every right to be concerned about Iran. This is a regime that at the highest levels has expressed the desire to destroy Israel, that has denied the Holocaust, that has expressed venomous anti-Semitic ideas and is a big country with a big population and has a sophisticated military'. So Israel is right to be concerned about Iran, and they should be absolutely concerned that Iran doesn’t get a nuclear weapon. But this framework initiative, if it can be implemented, can satisfy that Israeli strategic concern with more effectiveness and at less cost to Israel than any other approach. We know that a military strike or a series of military strikes can set back Iran’s nuclear program for a period of time — but almost certainly will prompt Iran to rush towards a bomb, will provide an excuse for hard-liners inside of Iran to say, ‘This is what happens when you don’t have a nuclear weapon: America attacks."
"It is a good deal even if Iran doesn’t change at all. Even for somebody who believes, as I suspect Prime Minister Netanyahu believes, that there is no difference between Rouhani and the supreme leader and they’re all adamantly anti-West and anti-Israel and perennial liars and cheaters — even if you believed all that, this still would be the right thing to do. It would still be the best option for us to protect ourselves. In fact, you could argue that if they are implacably opposed to us, all the more reason for us to want to have a deal in which we know what they’re doing and that, for a long period of time, we can prevent them from having a nuclear weapon."
U.S. President Barack Obama

President Obama on the breakdown of bipartisan debate over Israel and his personal affinity with the Israeli people. This is an excerpt of an interview with Thomas L. Friedman.  By A.J. Chavar, Quynhanh Do, David Frank, Abe Sater and Ben Werschkul on Publish Date April 5, 2015. Photo by Todd Heisler/The New York Times.

"Iran has retained most of the essential elements of its nuclear military infrastructure. All of Iran's facilities will stay open."
"The defensive and offensive strategies of the Islamic Republic, given the chronic weakness of its conventional military, ultimately make sense only if nuclear weapons are added to the mix. The American, French and Israeli governments have compiled fat files on the clerical regime’s nuclear-weapons drive. No one who has read this material can possibly believe Iranian assertions about the nuclear program’s peaceful birth and intent. The history of this effort has involved North Korean levels of dishonesty, with clandestine plants, factories and procurement networks that successfully import highly sensitive nuclear equipment, even from the U.S."
"The inspections regime in Iran envisioned by the Obama administration will not even come close to the intrusiveness of the failed inspections in Iraq. Worse, once sanctions are lifted and billions of dollars of Iranian trade starts to flow again to European and Asian companies, the U.S. likely will be dealing with a U.N. even more politically divided, and more incapable of action, than in the days of Saddam and the run-up to the Iraq war in 2003."
"In an effort to circumvent possible congressional disapproval of his deal-making, Mr. Obama is voluntarily surrendering control of the implementation and verification of any agreement to the Security Council, where American leadership and influence are weak. The U.N.’s International Atomic Energy Agency, a decent little outfit of underpaid and underfunded bureaucrats and inspectors, can do good work when the Security Council is unified. The IAEA’s utility plummets when the council is divided."
Mark Dubowitz, executive director, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies

"Uranium enrichment and all our nuclear technology is solely for the development of Iran and it will not be against any countries in the region or the world."
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani

Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif upon his return to Tehran from nuclear talks in Lausanne, Switzerland, April 3. Photo: ISNA / BORNA GHASEMIBORNA GHASEMI/AFP/Getty Images

"It's a very important achievement, but this is merely a framework. The devil is in the details to be negotiated over the next three months. Each side will attempt to do a little clawing back."

Thomas Pickering, former U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs

The quibbling and denials have, in fact, begun; they started even before the ink had dried on the signatures gracing the agreement that the P5+1 and Iranian negotiators had wrenched from the unlikeliest to the possible. "The solutions are good for all as they stand. There is no need to spin using 'fact sheets' so early on", complained Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in a tweet, annoyed at the fact sheet the Obama administration had proudly displayed to demonstrate the astuteness of their negotiating skills.

 

Little wonder Iran's foreign minister is displeased by the fact sheet American-style, since it bears little resemblance to another fact sheet that the Iranians have themselves produced to great acclaim by the Iranian public, which touts their own version of what their skilled negotiators had managed to accomplish; in effect, swaying the imperative of Iranian nuclear technology to the advantage of their ongoing program, untrammelled by foreign cessation demands.

And the sanctions, oh those detestable economy-destroying sanctions; while the Americans and their bargaining partners were left with the impression that Iran had, more or less, agreed however reluctantly to the incremental lifting that they understood their agreement had spelled out, the Iranian delegation left the tedious, drawn-out negotiating table content that their implacable demand that with the signing of the final deal on June 30, sanctions would be lifted holus-bolus, restoring Iran's financial dealings at one fell swoop.

Mr. Zarif even point-blank informed reporters loftily while yet in Lausanne, Switzerland, that the accord would serve to preserve Iran's right to enrich uranium and maintain its nuclear facilities. So what, precisely, has been accomplished? Strange you would ask that. If you did, as so many have, it must mean that the public relations on steroids that the administration has flung into action to counteract the criticisms left, right and centre, haven't fully answered all questions.

Such as Secretary of State John Kerry's claim that the deal would effectively serve to eliminate Iran's capacity to produce nuclear weapons for a decade at least, through the reduction in its stockpile of enriched uranium that Iran had agreed to send to Russia, then decided it had done no such thing, and by diminishing the number of its centrifuges spinning away like mad, by two-thirds. Of the ten thousand centrifuges it was processing uranium with, the U.S. came into the bargaining room insisting that only 500 would be needed for domestic purposes.

Iran came out of that discussion being permitted to continue using six thousand of its centrifuges. On the surface in any event, since the Islamic Republic of Iran has long been known for its canny capacity to gull and covertly build nuclear laboratories deep underground to allay suspicions and ensure they would not be detected. As for those assurances of IAEA inspections being able to keep abreast of all that occurs in Iran and give ample warning in good time, that doesn't reflect what has happened in the past, when Iran has obdurately refused IAEA inspectors entry to key areas of concern.

These nasty little details in reflection of reality do comprise a huge irritation factor in the satisfaction that the P5+1 -- exhausted by Iran's adamant position on its right to do as it wishes, when and how it plans to, and no one has the right to interfere, and for the sake of the Hidden Imam and the end days of Islam's final triumph, lift those sanctions! -- managed to convey as triumphant hand-shakes went the rounds and the negotiations for the preliminary agreement were sketched out to 'everyone's satisfaction'.