To Stop Iran’s Bomb, Bomb Iran
FOR
years, experts worried that the Middle East would face an
uncontrollable nuclear-arms race if Iran ever acquired weapons
capability. Given the region’s political, religious and ethnic
conflicts, the logic is straightforward.
As
in other nuclear proliferation cases like India, Pakistan and North
Korea, America and the West were guilty of inattention when they should
have been vigilant. But failing to act in the past is no excuse for
making the same mistakes now. All presidents enter office facing the
cumulative effects of their predecessors’ decisions. But each is
responsible for what happens on his watch. President Obama’s approach on
Iran has brought a bad situation to the brink of catastrophe.
In
theory, comprehensive international sanctions, rigorously enforced and
universally adhered to, might have broken the back of Iran’s nuclear
program. But the sanctions imposed have not met those criteria.
Naturally, Tehran wants to be free of them, but the president’s own director of National Intelligence testified in 2014 that they had not stopped Iran’s progressing its nuclear program. There is now widespread acknowledgment that the rosy 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, which judged that Iran’s weapons program was halted in 2003, was an embarrassment, little more than wishful thinking.
the
oil-producing monarchies, has long been expected to move first. No way
would the Sunni Saudis allow the Shiite Persians to outpace them in the
quest for dominance within Islam and Middle Eastern geopolitical
hegemony. Because of reports of early Saudi funding, analysts have long believed
that Saudi Arabia has an option to obtain nuclear weapons from
Pakistan, allowing it to become a nuclear-weapons state overnight. Egypt
and Turkey, both with imperial legacies and modern aspirations, and
similarly distrustful of Tehran, would be right behind.
Ironically
perhaps, Israel’s nuclear weapons have not triggered an arms race.
Other states in the region understood — even if they couldn’t admit it
publicly — that Israel’s nukes were intended as a deterrent, not as an
offensive measure.
Iran
is a different story. Extensive progress in uranium enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing reveal its ambitions. Saudi, Egyptian and Turkish
interests are complex and conflicting, but faced with Iran’s threat,
all have concluded that nuclear weapons are essential.
The
former Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Turki al-Faisal, said recently,
“whatever comes out of these talks, we will want the same.” He added,
“if Iran has the ability to enrich uranium to whatever level, it’s not
just Saudi Arabia that’s going to ask for that.” Obviously, the Saudis,
Turkey and Egypt will not be issuing news releases trumpeting their
intentions. But the evidence is accumulating that they have quickened
their pace toward developing weapons.
Saudi
Arabia has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with South Korea,
China, France and Argentina, aiming to build a total of 16 reactors by
2030. The Saudis also just hosted meetings
with the leaders of Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey; nuclear matters were
almost certainly on the agenda. Pakistan could quickly supply nuclear
weapons or technology to Egypt, Turkey and others. Or, for the right
price, North Korea might sell behind the backs of its Iranian friends.
The
Obama administration’s increasingly frantic efforts to reach agreement
with Iran have spurred demands for ever-greater concessions from
Washington. Successive administrations, Democratic and Republican,
worked hard, with varying success, to forestall or terminate efforts to
acquire nuclear weapons by states as diverse as South Korea, Taiwan,
Argentina, Brazil and South Africa. Even where civilian nuclear reactors
were tolerated, access to the rest of the nuclear fuel cycle was
typically avoided. Everyone involved understood why.
The
inescapable conclusion is that Iran will not negotiate away its nuclear
program. Nor will sanctions block its building a broad and deep weapons
infrastructure. The inconvenient truth is that only military action
like Israel’s 1981 attack on Saddam Hussein’s Osirak reactor in Iraq or its 2007 destruction of a Syrian reactor, designed and built by North Korea, can accomplish what is required. Time is terribly short, but a strike can still succeed.
Mr.
Obama’s fascination with an Iranian nuclear deal always had an air of
unreality. But by ignoring the strategic implications of such diplomacy,
these talks have triggered a potential wave of nuclear programs. The
president’s biggest legacy could be a thoroughly nuclear-weaponized
Middle East.
John R. Bolton, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, was the United States ambassador to the United Nations from August 2005 to December 2006
Labels: Conflict, Iran, Negotiations, Nuclear Technology, Sanctions
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