CAVEAT EMPTOR

"There's an authorized exception under our trade agreements for the building of infrastructure that the government deems critical for national security.  And it overrides our normal trade deal provisions.
"This government is going to be choosing carefully in the construction of this network and it has invoked the national security exception for the building of this network."
Andrew MacDougall, director of communications, Office of the Prime Minister

All of this suspicion of a trading partner well known for its underhanded manipulations resulting in industrial and government and military espionage certainly throws a spanner in the works of hoping to increase trade opportunities between Canada and China.  The allure of earning greater trade dollars in the exchange between the two countries is a powerful one, given China's huge market, second only to that of the United States.

And since Canada has always, despite the more open-ended, but still Congress-fraught-interference of the NAFTA agreement, experienced complications with its largest trading partner, it's more than a bit of a bummer that while the U.S. seeks to advance its own advantages over that of its trading partners, the alternative trade source, China, also seeks advantages and these represent areas where true harm can be done to Canadian interests.

Every sovereign country has a right to safeguard its interests, from national security to industry and natural resource blueprints and technical data that give advantages that others would like to survey for themselves.  A free exchange of data is not in the offing, unlike what occurs when scientists share discoveries for the greater good of the globe.  Technical data and industrial initiatives are protected from sharing, since they equate with wealth accumulation and national security.

 A report just issued by the United States Congressional Intelligence Committee hearing evidence over an 11 month period of study came to a conclusion that it would represent a harm to the United States to give government contracts to two Chinese companies that produce telecommunications equipment.  ZTE Corporation and Huawei Technologies Co.Ltd. were named as security risks in the United States and private companies placed on notice for issuing contracts to them.

So here is Canada,, making much of opportunities in the East to expand trade and be less reliant on the political tugs and decision making on the part of our southern neighbour, contemplating sidelining our U.S. interests and expanding trade into Brazil, India the European Union, (Jordan, Colombia) and China.  And boasting that Canada is 'open for business' and, of course, inviting investment, in a hugely co-operative trade-and-investment mood.

Until reality impinges.  And our reliable/unreliable southern neighbour sounds the warning of just how vulnerable trust in honourable business practise makes us.  Blindsided by dollar signs, we tend to overlook our vulnerability to stealthily covert operations made possible by the production of computer parts that transmit communications within the country, but which can also be used to transmit data out of the country.

The potential of losing control of our resources, of our command structures, of our universal networks controlling communications and civil utilities and the flow of energy and data represents a monumental disaster-in-the-making, should it ever occur.  And it certainly could, if successful infiltration by programmed parts inserted into the national stream of vital networks took place.

So, should the Government of Canada stand by and watch while huge and far-reaching contracts are given out to corporations that have a presence within the country as reliable, legitimate sources of equipment, with the prospect of their allegiance being first and foremost to a foreign government which can call upon the allegiance of their corporate structure in service to the country of origin?

Shenzhen-based Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. was awarded $6.5-million to expand the Ontario government's R&D facility in Ottawa last year.  Huawei supplies components to major Canadian telecom companies like Bell, Telus Corp. and SaskTel.  Huawei technology is used widely within Canada in wireless networks.

"Bell manages security appropriately with all our network suppliers, including Huawei", assures a Bell spokesperson jauntily.  Shenzhen-based Huawei was founded by a former general in the People's Republic Army; it is a formidably powerful corporation, representing the world's second largest producer of routers, switches and telecommunications equipment.

Canada's government has a headache on its hands; several in fact.  First up is the Nexen deal and the proposed buyout by Chinese state-controlled CNOOC Ltd.  Following that eventual decision,  whether to permit a Chinese telecommunications giant to contract into a secure communications network for the country.  One can only assume that the PMO is listening carefully.

"You might think you're buying part of your product from a Canadian company but they in fact very often subcontract their parts from another country so it is actually very difficult to tell (the origins) of some of these companies.  There could be some capability built into them so that hackers could break into the system later and disrupt communications, which could be used to lay the groundwork for a later attack or for some form of espionage."  John Aycock, science professor, computer security,  University of Calgary

"This will be a big red flag because (allowing the Nexen deal to go through) will put our relationship with the U.S. at risk.  (The U.S.) would definitely second-guess our common sense and judgement when it comes to national security and it will impact what sensitive information they choose to share with us."  
Juneau -Katsuya, former chief of Asia-Pacific Operations, CSIS