Getting It Together

Now there's an interesting side issue to come out of the concluding 52-nation conference on nuclear security that took place in Seoul, South Korea. Upon the very doorstep of the country next door that has been doing overtime business in terrifying the world about its nuclear ambitions. Partnering with that other global nuclear pariah, Iran, North Korea has viewed askance the summit taking place next door.

Threatening to take umbrage anew each time it perceives itself as being criticized for its nuclear ambitions and perceived entitlements. And, not that Canada is being placed in a similar category, but simply that another critical safety issue was broached during the conference. Relating to Canada's premier place within the international community as a major producer of medical isotopes. And its nuclear safety responsibilities.

Fact is, the nuclear technology that Canada has traditionally employed, and continues to, in its processing of medical isotopes, is with the use of weapons-grade uranium. Weapons-grade uranium that, in fact is procured from the United States. Processed at the federal government's Chalk River reactor. Which, the Government of Canada has pledged to close down by 2016.

And to move to a different type of processing, where a newer isotope production facility is to make use of non-weapons-grade uranium. A move that Belgium, France and the Netherlands are also undertaking, alongside the United States. Only those countries have earmarked a date a year earlier than Canada to fulfill their obligation.

Nordion, one of the world's largest producers and suppliers of medical isotopes, has recently signed an arrangement with Russia to run to 2020, a ten-year agreement signed in 2010. The processing will be with the use of weapons-grade uranium obtained from Russia itself. It is estimated that 100,000 medical procedures each and every day are undertaken, reliant on the use of medical isotopes using that grade of radioactive substance now in contention.

Fears are that terrorists or criminal organizations are eager to obtain that radioactive material; weapons-grade uranium. Securing the material is of critical importance. One might say better that it be in the hands of a competent agency in a non-nuclear-producing country with full safeguards than that it languish in the vaults of countries that feel more casual about guarding the material.

In criticizing Canada there is also an element of competition involved. That Nordion will see a production advantage over its international competitors who are moving toward the use of non-weapons-grade uranium, while Nordion continues to use weapons-grade until its contract with Russia runs out.

Although the current Canadian government defends the Nordion-Russia agreement, emphasizing its commitment nonetheless to eliminate the use of weapons-grade uranium from medical isotope production, it might be a good idea for the company and government to get together seriously on the issue to ensure they're singing from the same hymnal.