Military Technology

Well that's pretty damn stupid, isn't it? Having so little control over the tracking of military technology that we don't know where it ends up? Little wonder the American administration is frustrated by the laissez-faire attitude of a close neighbour it shares high-value electronics in military applications with, as a trusted ally.

It's never pleasant to be brought up short by a friend and ally, to be informed that it is not very much appreciated when you have been spectacularly ineffective at halting advanced technology from sliding into the wrong hands. The fact that a malign body can obtain classified documents or ally-restricted advanced military technology is nothing to be proud of, when you're the supplier.

Some weapons-export agents working within Canada appear to be having great success in slipping past the notice of those authorized to ensure that there are no violations in the exportation of certain military-application materials. There's huge profits to be made in the arms export-import and sales business. Remember that military-industrial complex?

Agents representing the acquisition interests of international actors work in tandem to identify weak points of exit-and-entry, and it appears that Canada has presented as just such a venue. Oh, surprise, surprise.

"The (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) officers argued that until the price to be paid for export control violations is the same in Canada as it is in the U.S. 0 prison 0- adversaries will persist in abusing Canada as a venue from which they can illegally procure and export U.S. defence technologies." former U.S. Ambassador to Canada, David Wilkins

Matching that indictment was another made by a Canadian Border Services Agency officer who responded that the CBSA spent its time: "...targeting hundreds of mostly Iranian and Chinese foreigners as well as 'lots of Canadian dual-nationals" set up as "front companies for the purpose of procuring defence technologies". And we are, through lack of diligence and a lapsed sense of lawful deterrence, enabling them.

China, for example, was found to have powered up the engines on its newly-designed and produced attack helicopter, using Pratt & Whitney Canada's military technology, exported there for 'non-military' purposes. Pratt & Whitney claimed not to have known the parts would be used for the Chinese Z0-10 attack helicopter, the first the country had produced, thanks to the new engines.

And then there were the missile weapons parts being shipped out to Iran through the auspices of an individual of suspicious background who helped fabricate and ship them. U.S. officials asked for Canada's assistance in the investigation, but something went awry in the accuracy of the data transmitted. In addition, it seems there is a link between Canada's inadequate performance and the justice system.

"Canadian judges do not appreciate the seriousness of these crimes. When CBSA agents arrest perpetrators, judges let them out on bail and they simply disappear", read a cable from the CBSA, relating that of 25 export-control cases, only one resulted in jail time.