Mentoring the Afghan National Army

It certainly is interesting what is being revealed through a public airing related to the court martial of Captain Robert Semrau, accused of shooting to death a wounded Taliban fighter on a Helmand province battlefield. Captain Semrau steadfastly claims that his was an act of wartime charity.

That the wounded fighter was close to death and suffering the anguish of his mortal wounds. And that having shot him, he had helped the man find release from his unendurable pain. And that he would wish for the same action to be taken for him, were he to be in such a situation.

Witnesses to the event claim various truths. From the description of the wounded man who had been shot out of a tree along with another member of the Taliban by an airstrike responding to an ambush call, he was in a parlous state. He was shot point-blank, taken out of his pain, and the group moved on, hoping to avoid another ambush.

Captain Semrau's companion, Sg. Fournier testified that the wounded man's leg was all but severed. No blood was issuing from the man's wounds. He looked past resurrection. No first aid was given to help staunch the blood flow; there was no blood flow. The Afghan commander whom the Canadian contingent was mentoring was disinterested.

The mercy killing resulted from Captain Semrau's conviction that the man was as good as dead. He took steps to take him out of his misery. As leader of the four-man Canadian team embedded with an Afghan rifle company, he committed himself to a course of action not recognized as normal wartime procedure.

What is occurring in Afghanistan cannot conceivably be considered normal war in the sense that two opposing armies confront one another and proceed to demolish each other's positions, each seeking the strength of conquest. This is, instead, a war of stealth and opportunity, one that victimizes the civilian population in ways not seen in regular warfare.

What is interesting about all of this is the Canadian military's role with the Afghan military. Canadian soldiers, experienced and professional, mentoring an army of men from a tribal background whose professional training has been somewhat less than stellar. But mentoring them nonetheless, in the techniques of planning, tactics and ethics.

The Afghans, not surprisingly, do not appear to be too receptive to the role of Canada's Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams. And it hasn't been helpful that the Afghan forces are played out, suffering from lack of motivation, suffering from battle fatigue. It is their country, their battle, and they are not recalled for rest periods interspersed with further calls to duty.

Professional development for the officer corps is a Western conceit; it has no place in the tribalist heritage of a fighting militia in this part of the world. The Afghan National Army suffers from a decided supply lack, and scavenges anything useful from battlefields, inclusive of enemy weapons. They are easily startled and ready to fire off rounds to no account.

It is Canada's and NATO's role at this point, to desperately attempt to repair what was never present in the Afghan National Army. A professional standing army with a history of well trained troops schooled in the art of modern warfare does not describe the ANA.

Many of its members are not adequately uniformed, they are ill paid, they lack motivation, there is no enthusiasm for protecting a nation. What nation? They are more tribal than national in outlook and orientation. Orders cannot be given Afghan soldiers, outside their own singular command.

Helpful recommendations may be considered about operational conduct, but not necessarily. When working with police officers, some of whom wear traditional Afghan garb instead of uniforms, confusion may readily arise. The officers set themselves casually apart from the men, beyond the battlefield where the troops are engaged in combat.

Afghans feel themselves under no particular obligation to heed the professional advice of combat-hardened-and-trained Canadian advisers, even when that advice is offered in conciliatory tones. Yet the Canadians accompanying the Afghans on manoeuvres must rely on the Afghans for their own safety, given their superior numbers.

This does not reflect ideal conditions in battling an insurgency difficult to pin down and counter. Little wonder there are occasions when difficult choices may be made that come back to haunt those who choose them.