His Political Intransigence
All the signs appear to be there on the horizon; an election we don't really want, but appear set for. Engineered in no small part by the unwillingness of one political party to reasonably deal with realities, preferring partisan bickering and semantics over reaching an agreement with their political opponents, who just happen now to represent the elected government of Canada.
Stephane Dion, in fact, hardly knows which way is up, in any event. Insisting as he does, that Canada's NATO-committed troops in Afghanistan be taken immediately and directly out of their combat role. That it was his own party, while in government that chose Kandahar Province for the Canadian presence, appears immaterial to Mr. Dion's current mode of response.
That the reconstruction and training work that he insists Canadian troops undertake - relinquishing the combat role - is unwholesomely unrealistic, given that the Taliban have a penchant for infiltrating any unprotected territory and making it, once again, their own.
How to engage in unobstructed reconstruction and training while remaining in the bailiwick of a resurgently-determined Taliban, however, remains a problem as yet unaddressed by Mr. Dion. These truly do representing irritatingly trivial considerations, it might seem.
Perhaps representative of his alarming lack of the capacity of facing reality and seeing a problem in the round, attempting to distill data into a workable formula, he is also capable, as he proved just recently, of insisting that NATO be pressed into taking an aggressive presence in Pakistan, to deal with the ongoing problem of tribal jihadists.
NATO, after all, is the representative body of countries that form it. Canada is but one of those countries. To suggest that a singular country withdraw itself from active combat, while engaged in a vital population-and territory-protective role; at the same time recommending that the representative body undertake active combat - uninvited, in a sovereign country's geography - does not appear to strike Mr. Dion as contradictory.
Prime Minister Stephen Harper swallowed his impatience, strove to discipline his compulsive contempt for ill-reasoned counter-attacks and attempted to carefully explain his government's position on staying the course in the context of the Manley Report on Canada's position in Afghanistan, with Mr. Dion.
Rashly believing that reason could persuade the academic Mr. Dion to more carefully assess Canada's options. With the understanding that Mr. Dion, post-meeting, would ponder the situation, reach a decision, and convey it to him personally. Mr. Dion conveyed the outcome of his considered opinion, post-consultation with the leader of the NDP instead:
"If the government doesn't want to do anything to explore that our views might be compatible after February 2009 ... the government will look as usual intransigent and the consequence may be an election", he trumpeted wisely, warning of dire consequences, to reporters while in Vancouver.
While, interestingly enough, his own second in command in the Liberal party, appeared to see eye-to-eye with Mr. Harper. Speaking like a well-adjusted political leader, and possibly positioning himself for just that future role, Michael Ignatieff felt the rashly impertinent manner displayed by the incumbent leader of his party would lead to an undesired result.
To wit: abandonment by Canada of its commitments both to NATO and to the mission in Afghanistan; the insistence of which would lead inevitably to a hastily-called election, questioning whether it would be "in the national interest for us to plunge the country into a bitter election on an issue where Canadians, I think desperately, right across the partisan divide, want us to pull together and do our jobs as politicians."
Yes, indeed yes.
Stephane Dion, in fact, hardly knows which way is up, in any event. Insisting as he does, that Canada's NATO-committed troops in Afghanistan be taken immediately and directly out of their combat role. That it was his own party, while in government that chose Kandahar Province for the Canadian presence, appears immaterial to Mr. Dion's current mode of response.
That the reconstruction and training work that he insists Canadian troops undertake - relinquishing the combat role - is unwholesomely unrealistic, given that the Taliban have a penchant for infiltrating any unprotected territory and making it, once again, their own.
How to engage in unobstructed reconstruction and training while remaining in the bailiwick of a resurgently-determined Taliban, however, remains a problem as yet unaddressed by Mr. Dion. These truly do representing irritatingly trivial considerations, it might seem.
Perhaps representative of his alarming lack of the capacity of facing reality and seeing a problem in the round, attempting to distill data into a workable formula, he is also capable, as he proved just recently, of insisting that NATO be pressed into taking an aggressive presence in Pakistan, to deal with the ongoing problem of tribal jihadists.
NATO, after all, is the representative body of countries that form it. Canada is but one of those countries. To suggest that a singular country withdraw itself from active combat, while engaged in a vital population-and territory-protective role; at the same time recommending that the representative body undertake active combat - uninvited, in a sovereign country's geography - does not appear to strike Mr. Dion as contradictory.
Prime Minister Stephen Harper swallowed his impatience, strove to discipline his compulsive contempt for ill-reasoned counter-attacks and attempted to carefully explain his government's position on staying the course in the context of the Manley Report on Canada's position in Afghanistan, with Mr. Dion.
Rashly believing that reason could persuade the academic Mr. Dion to more carefully assess Canada's options. With the understanding that Mr. Dion, post-meeting, would ponder the situation, reach a decision, and convey it to him personally. Mr. Dion conveyed the outcome of his considered opinion, post-consultation with the leader of the NDP instead:
"If the government doesn't want to do anything to explore that our views might be compatible after February 2009 ... the government will look as usual intransigent and the consequence may be an election", he trumpeted wisely, warning of dire consequences, to reporters while in Vancouver.
While, interestingly enough, his own second in command in the Liberal party, appeared to see eye-to-eye with Mr. Harper. Speaking like a well-adjusted political leader, and possibly positioning himself for just that future role, Michael Ignatieff felt the rashly impertinent manner displayed by the incumbent leader of his party would lead to an undesired result.
To wit: abandonment by Canada of its commitments both to NATO and to the mission in Afghanistan; the insistence of which would lead inevitably to a hastily-called election, questioning whether it would be "in the national interest for us to plunge the country into a bitter election on an issue where Canadians, I think desperately, right across the partisan divide, want us to pull together and do our jobs as politicians."
Yes, indeed yes.
Labels: Canada, Crisis Politics
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