NATO DEFENCE

"What is repeated non-stop on the issue of Russia and Crimea is that what Russia did looks unacceptable, and has been said to have been unacceptable, but it is still accepted."
"Many [Ukrainians] thought that all the West had to do was to call Putin and tell him to stop it. But that was not possible."
Vera Nanivska, International Centre for Policy Studies, Kyiv

Well, let's see now, how well NATO is prepared to intervene in such a situation. This is not Libya we're discussing here, it is Russia. And to even imagine that NATO countries might be prepared to go to war with Russia is to imagine the unthinkable. It's not quite clear what it might take for NATO to consider Russian transgressions so grave as to merit military intervention, but its very swift and decisive action in Ukraine is not one of them in and of itself.

FILE - In this Wednesday, March 12, 2014 file photo, A NATO AWACS plane takes off the NATO Airbase in Geilenkirchen, Germany. Russia's readiness to use military force in Ukraine has been a wake-up call for many European countries, which since the Iron Curtain crumbled have slashed defense spending. Some shifted their priorities toward international missions in Afghanistan and elsewhere rather than deterring potential aggression from the East. Now, a serious recalibration is underway, particularly in countries with memories of Soviet tanks rumbling across their borders. (AP Photo/Frank Augstein, File)

If the world and Ukraine happen to be fortunate enough, Vladimir Putin's word for the moment that he is disinterested in acquiring any more Ukrainian geography for Russia might relax vigilance. But though he has stated he has no intention on moving in on eastern Ukraine, it does, on the record of past performances, sound unconvincing. Call him out on it, perhaps not, but it won't take too long for the immediate opportunity to either pass or to further develop.

After the Cold War had lapsed into sweetness and light, Western countries felt relaxed enough about the vastly diminished potential for conflict that they began systematically cutting back on their armed forces expenditures. None seemed to be exempt from this exercise in relaxed vigilance. After all, the world had succeeded in influencing the USSR sufficiently to have its former satellites successfully edge themselves out of the orbit of a weakened and less sustainable alliance.

Attention turned elsewhere, as national governments felt they could stop squandering their nations' finances on arms and their military to address home-grown social issues instead. "An obvious misjudgement", commented former Swedish defence minister Mikael Odenberg. Whose resignation in 2007 in protest against military spending cuts in his country foretold current events.

European countries who thought that former Russian aggression had died with the expiration date of the USSR forgot that Russian restlessness in such issues is traditional.

The Kremlin's preparedness to allow their president to call up military force in Ukraine seems to have surprised many of its former satellite countries, and that, in and of itself, is a surprise. Russia's surliness has continued to be expressed in the wake of the dissolution of the USSR in the country's trade and energy export relations with both eastern and western Europe.

There have always been residual intimations of what might yet come.

Yet former Iron Curtain adversaries and satellites as well saw fit to slash their military budgets as priorities led them elsewhere. And why wouldn't they, after all? Rational human beings would always far prefer the practicalities of looking after urgent social issues and to set aside nasty thoughts of military aggression. Except that military aggression is not always rational and the aggressors, if this is one of their traditions, just as Crimean accession seemed to be, feel entitled to what they're familiar with.

"If we don't do something quickly about it, some of our capabilities will be degraded to such an extent that they cease to exist", stated Czech armed forces chief Petr Pavel, at a conference last week marking the 15th anniversary of the Czech Republic's entry into NATO. The fact is that a mere handful of NATO's Europe members meet the alliance's spending goal of two percent of GDP on defence. Canada certainly doesn't.

The financial crisis still making its dismal way through the international community, saw defence budgets dropped even further.

Russia, on the other hand, took up its usual stance, flexing its military muscle, and sending long-range strategic bomber flights on high. Russia invested in acquiring more advanced military technology, which outsiders assumed represented the modernization of military forces that had seen hard times. Which was true, but it was also true for a distinct purpose; for Russia to assert itself toward its former super-power status. And nothing does it like military power.

"I think a lot of people did underestimate the willingness of Russia to actually use them [their new military strength and new determination to assert power]", said Samuel Perlo-Freeman, a global military spending analyst at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. It is likely, in his opinion, that Moscow's new assertiveness will promote an increase in military budgets in Central Europe and around the Baltic Sea.

Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia are increasing their military budgets and they have called on NATO to move resources there, inclusive of ground troops and missile defences. NATO has increased air patrols over the Baltic countries. France offered to add four more fighter jets to ease their concerns. Those three former Soviet republics recall a history of quarrels with Moscow over their own Russian speaking minorities.

President Putin's cited concern for the welfare of minority Russian-speaking populations in neighbouring countries has sent a message not to be overlooked. There is the example of Georgia, and now Ukraine, sending shivers down the collective backs of former Russian satellites, earnestly wishing to remain divorced from Russia.

Western Europe's two largest military spenders, Britain and France do not appear set to change their existing military budgets. In Southern Europe "fiscal austerity has already seen some of the largest percentage reductions in defence outlays in Europe", pointed out Giri Rajendran of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

As for the United States, its military spending is on a downward spiral, while still leaving its defence budget the largest in the world by any measure. U.S. Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel commented, while at NATO headquarters, that his country is shrinking its military size without compromising its capabilities. His opinion is that European allies should be taking the same approach.