Federal Security Deficiencies

Canada's Department of National Defence has been dragged finally into agreeing to make a realistic effort at securing itself from external espionage threats and the kinds of breaches that resulted from a culture of relaxed concern that allowed former intelligence officer Jeffrey Paul Delisle to operate as an agent for Russian intelligence-gathering over a five-year period of uninterrupted espionage.

He earned $110,000 from Russian intelligence eager to receive secret documents meant for no eyes but those of Canada, the United States, Australia, Britain and New Zealand.

A Nova Scotia court gave former Naval intelligence officer Jeffrey Delisle a twenty-year prison sentence after a guilty plea of spying for the Russians while disloyally working in intelligence for the Canadian military. Russia was not at fault; they hadn't gone out of their way to recruit Mr. Delisle; he approached them and offered his services.

What enterprising regime accustomed to spying on its neighbours and other world powers with which it is not always in complete agreement would spurn such an offer, after all?

And knowing the proclivity of such countries to expand their espionage activities wherever and whenever possible, it might have seemed reasonable that an expectation that National Defence would always be alert to such misdeeds and take needed steps to isolate itself from such potentials would be realized in infallible security systems being put in place.

But no, it appears that complacency ruled the day. And this, despite having been warned repeatedly that it needed to bolster security.

Audit after audit revealed gaps in security, requiring new systems to be put in place. And time after time National Defence merely seemed to shrug off the necessity to address these deficiencies. "National Defence, if it had tried, could not have done worse. The security precautions were abysmal", University of Toronto security expert Wesley Wark said, as someone knowledgeable about such matters, tracking the state of the country's defence and security operations.

Now, finally, Chief of Defence Staff General Tom Lawson has declared that National Defence is "actively pursuing measures to improve and enhance all facets of our security procedures. This includes undertaking a complete functional review and rewrite of the defence security policy suite, a realignment of all aspects of security in the department, and working with other government departments to discuss, synchronize, and adopt best practices."

Which is just as well, since Canada's closest allies, those of the "Five Eyes" community, have had reason of late to doubt the reliability of Canada's defence and intelligence communities in their dedication to sound practise in sharing and shielding national and international intelligence data of immense interest to prying eyes.

According to Mr. Wark, "They're doing something because they had no choice to do something", in reactive response to threats by the U.S. Britain, Australia and New Zealand to diminish Canada's access to sensitive intelligence if a reliably concerted effort to protect classified data is not undertaken.

The incredible situation where CSIS hesitated to share vital espionage-detection data incriminating naval intelligence officer Jeffrey Delisle with the RCMP for fear of revealing intelligence-gathering procedures in a public venue such as a trial, enabling in the process a continuation of Delisle's handing over of critical intelligence to the Russians created a huge embarrassment for Canada and the Conservative government.

Predictably, Public Safety Minister Vic Toews informed the House of Commons that "information is indeed shared between law enforcement agencies in accordance with Canadian law"; that an article attesting otherwise, revealing a gap in sharing between the country's two primary intelligence agencies, was incorrect. He is doubtless correct, that information is generally shared, but in this very particular instance, it appears not to have been.