The Crucial 20% Threshhold

Fool me once shame on you, fool me twice, I'm the fool. 

The Islamic Republic of Iran has no shame, feels no shame, sees no reason to apportion shame.  It knows what it wants and it intends to succeed.  Under duress it struggles but persists and schemes to find a way.  That way has generally been to throw around a few demonstrably ill-conceived accusations, then resort to promises it has no intention of honouring for the greater advantage of deceiving an adversary to its eventual advantage.

And so it is with the diplomacy that Iran practises, hinting at its willingness to compromise - but only if those insisting that it do so, are themselves prepared to surrender to certain of Iran's dictates.  Perhaps in Yukia Amano, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, palavering with the Republic's lead negotiator for the nuclear file represents a wise head unwilling to be forestalled by protestations of innocence.  Hoping they will prevail. 

But then, perhaps not.

Iran insists it is prepared to alter its plans to some degree.  Never to the extent that it would agree to completely give up its plans for nuclear attainment.  For strictly civil, peaceful purposes, to be sure.  In which case its enrichment of uranium to 20% is completely unnecessary.  And its secretive and illegal installations where such enrichment is taking place would be entirely redundant to its 'true' purpose.

The meeting between Yukia Aman and Iran's Saeed Jalili was no doubt provocatively redolent of promises that could be made and met if certain provisions were guaranteed.  In which case IAEA inspectors could and might be permitted to investigate and interview certain scientists and facilities, including military ones (Iran's Republican Guard is completely in charge of the nuclear installations) in exchange for which concessions favouring Iran must be immediately launched in reciprocation.

And this was the significant breakthrough harbouring potentials sought in agreement that Yukia Amano was able to convey to the P5+1; the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany. 



Alas, the plan that the P5+1 presented to Iran was not entirely - not remotely - to its liking.  "What you are asking for is ... not what we agreed to in Instanbul", was the response from Iran, according to an Iranian diplomat.  In reference to the demands proffered by the six world negotiators insisting that Iran cap its uranium enrichment to the 5% level; and scrap its Fordow enrichment facility.

Matters did not at all proceed as Iran felt they should.  Instead of appearing "reciprocal, simultaneous, and ... balanced", complained the Iranian diplomat, the negotiators informed Mr. Jalili that there would eventually result "consideration" in the easing of sanctions at a "later" date, much after Iran agreed to making the concessions demanded of it.

 Iran appears to have been disconcertingly surprised at the turn of events, since things looked so hopeful from their perspective.  Oily assurances of co-operation appear to have netted them nothing like what confident expectations led them to believe.  Mr. Jalili's frequent requests to Catherine Ashton to ease sanctions evidently did not result in a sympathetic hearing that would translate to a more open and useful mode of concessions in Iran's favour.

Yet.