Reformation of Afghan Aid Mechanisms

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has long agitated for international funding to go directly to his government. It would, after all, make sense for international donors to directly fund government initiatives, giving it more credibility with the population once the government is seen to be fulfilling its role in adequately governing. As matters stand, international funding is funnelled primarily through international groups set up within the country to provide needed services, and the ISAF countries fund their own programs, permitting relatively modest amounts to go directly to the Afghan government.

At the recently-concluded Lisbon G20 meeting which Hamid Karzai was invited to attend, he made yet another sincere pitch for direct funding, recommending that at least 50% of pledged international funding go to his government. Prime Minister Stephen Harper had other ideas and did not shirk from directly addressing the topic. He made it quite clear that he and his government had no intention of directing funding to the Karzai government at this time. Due consideration would be given to the request when Mr. Karzai was able to prove that he has finally tackled his country's endemic corruption.

More to the point, the corruption that exists within his government, within his cabinet and his parliament, let alone the civil service and encompassing every aspect of government services. It is a conundrum, a never-ending, roundabout of frustration. The state of Afghanistan is in a tenuous position, the population has no firm reason to trust a government that cannot deliver basic necessities of which security is the first element. Without security the country is unable to advance toward fulfilling the other needs of the populace.

It would make good sense for the Karzai government to be given direct funding aid, if it could be relied upon to use the funding wisely and trustfully in a manner that does justice to the needs of the country. For far too long however, the machinery of state has played second fiddle to the kleptocracy that Mr. Karzai assembled around him from his brother, to tribal chieftains, and warlords, and those heavily engaged in drug profiteering which generally encompasses most of those in positions of power and influence in the country - including the Taliban.

Aid continues to be delivered through the well funded auspices of international aid groups who can be relied upon to do the job, while government figures simply have a tradition of pocketing whatever they can, and whatever is left over is dribbled into government programs. The government has been starkly ineffective at governing, at administering needed civil and development programs. It simply is not yet feasible that they be entrusted with developing a budget and implementing and controlling most projects. And while they are emasculated in this manner there is no reason for the population to respect them.

If there is a strategy that no one has yet thought of, neither the UN nor NATO nor the United States, no one appears any the wiser with respect to a workable approach. How to expunge the traditions of corruption in the country and infuse the lawmakers with an enthusiasm to work on behalf of the country and its people, without resorting to spiriting away funding for themselves? Yet until and unless the government is finally deemed capable of responsible apportioning of international aid funding, and dispersing it and controlling it successfully nothing is achieved to give them legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan population.

There are no reliable, working Afghan government operations to give credibility to the government and assurances to the population. There is the Taliban always in the background, and sometimes in the foreground, depending on the provinces being viewed, repositories of a fanatically stringent ideology prepared to restore itself to power - and with the help of neighbouring Pakistan - as soon as the international community lets its guard down. Which it is anxious enough to do in a sense, eager to depart the troubled country to let it get on with its own future.

In the meantime, the tedious and cumbersome work of trying to persuade the Karzai government that it must determine its own fate by cleaning up its disreputable and nation-harmful corruption to earn the right to take full control of international funding must be a goal to advance before all the international groups finally decamp. Concerned international groups can demand accountability, and emphasize the need for the Afghan government to be responsible to itself and to the country but it is the government itself of Afghanistan that must commit itself to its future.