Complicit Conviviality
They once had a common goal, the fanatical Taliban and Pakistan's secret service, in a reflection of the government's attitude toward its neighbour Afghanistan. Official Pakistan was complicit in co-operating with, aiding and encouraging quite a few extremist Islamist groups; those whose purpose was to govern Afghanistan under strict Sharia law, and those whose purpose was to attack India. Pakistan's insistence that Kashmir is its territory, to be taken from India by force a flash-point of bitter assaults.
Pakistan had committed itself to the stealthy, covert support and financing of fundamentalist Islamist groups, confident that it had the means to control them, to direct their attention where it was convenient for Pakistan to wreak instability to suit its political agenda. It did turn out to be quite inconvenient, however, when the Red Mosque in the centre of Islamabad sent its students out to challenge the laxness of Islamic ritual and law, however.
And when General Pervez Musharraf had the military storm the mosque as a result of its challenge to the secular-based, semi-democratic authority of the government matters began to subtly turn. Subsequent (and previous) agreements that the government signed with the fundamentalist Islamists in the Swat Valley on the theory that they could co-exist; the fanatics in control of an area the government was never able to convince the tribal chiefs to allow government troops into, simply gave encouragement to the Islamists.
It was perfectly all right with Pakistan's governments that the Afghan Taliban situated themselves just inside the border among the hill tribes - along with their political-religious compatriots al-Qaeda - for refuge from U.S. and NATO troops seeking them out, as long as they stayed there and didn't inconvenience Pakistan. However, when the Pakistan-based Taliban emerged, and subsequent agreements fell apart, the situation became somewhat more complex.
The Pakistani Taliban had goals the government of Pakistan found impossible to accommodate. And the Taliban simply began to spread their influence, moving down from the mountainous regions toward Peshawar, uncomfortably close to the military's arms depots and nuclear installations - placed there to ensure they were as far as possible from the border with India. Years of fanatical Islamists attacking police outposts and training stations in the region accelerated.
But then, the increased belligerence, violence and successes of the Pakistani Taliban mounting one attack after another on the police, the military, the towns and closing in on Peshawar, finally convinced the government - and the military - that they could no longer tolerate these destabilizing incursions. With the advance of the Taliban, hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis fled the impacted area, becoming internal refugees.
And the Taliban were emboldened by their successes to mount attacks in the very capital of the country with their surreptitious capability to somehow get around tight security and enter the most heavily-guarded government precincts, destroying government offices, blowing up crowded marketplaces, killing hundreds of people. And the final humiliation; a suicide truck bomb destroying the regional headquarters of the Inter Services Intelligence agency in Peshawar.
The heavily barricaded compound with its steel barrier and its guards were no match for the determination of a suicide bomber driving a mini-truck with 300 kilograms of explosives. The three-story U-shaped building was devastated, 18 people killed and many others maimed. One might think that a Muslim country living in a perpetual state of violent disarray stemming from its incessant antagonistic volleys both diplomat-verbal and violently militant, might know better than to ally itself with those more fanatical than themselves.
The violent rancour the government had incurred when it suddenly revoked support for fanatic jihad has come back to haunt it. The incendiary bomb of hatred that it had itself lit has it now struggling for its own existence. There is no possible accommodation that a nation envisioning itself as a modern Muslim, secular-governed country can make with a jihad-dedicated extremist ideology determined to give no quarter to its perceived enemies.
Nor does such an Islamist-jihadi-dedicated force wish for any to be proffered to itself, in its triumph-intoxicated religious ecstasy. The agony of Pakistan, should it somehow be only partially successful in its tardy response to the Pakistani Taliban movement with its military offensive in South Waziristan, will be as nothing to the region should a a domino-effect result that could see the advance of militant Islam spreading its tentacles with confidence.
Pakistan had committed itself to the stealthy, covert support and financing of fundamentalist Islamist groups, confident that it had the means to control them, to direct their attention where it was convenient for Pakistan to wreak instability to suit its political agenda. It did turn out to be quite inconvenient, however, when the Red Mosque in the centre of Islamabad sent its students out to challenge the laxness of Islamic ritual and law, however.
And when General Pervez Musharraf had the military storm the mosque as a result of its challenge to the secular-based, semi-democratic authority of the government matters began to subtly turn. Subsequent (and previous) agreements that the government signed with the fundamentalist Islamists in the Swat Valley on the theory that they could co-exist; the fanatics in control of an area the government was never able to convince the tribal chiefs to allow government troops into, simply gave encouragement to the Islamists.
It was perfectly all right with Pakistan's governments that the Afghan Taliban situated themselves just inside the border among the hill tribes - along with their political-religious compatriots al-Qaeda - for refuge from U.S. and NATO troops seeking them out, as long as they stayed there and didn't inconvenience Pakistan. However, when the Pakistan-based Taliban emerged, and subsequent agreements fell apart, the situation became somewhat more complex.
The Pakistani Taliban had goals the government of Pakistan found impossible to accommodate. And the Taliban simply began to spread their influence, moving down from the mountainous regions toward Peshawar, uncomfortably close to the military's arms depots and nuclear installations - placed there to ensure they were as far as possible from the border with India. Years of fanatical Islamists attacking police outposts and training stations in the region accelerated.
But then, the increased belligerence, violence and successes of the Pakistani Taliban mounting one attack after another on the police, the military, the towns and closing in on Peshawar, finally convinced the government - and the military - that they could no longer tolerate these destabilizing incursions. With the advance of the Taliban, hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis fled the impacted area, becoming internal refugees.
And the Taliban were emboldened by their successes to mount attacks in the very capital of the country with their surreptitious capability to somehow get around tight security and enter the most heavily-guarded government precincts, destroying government offices, blowing up crowded marketplaces, killing hundreds of people. And the final humiliation; a suicide truck bomb destroying the regional headquarters of the Inter Services Intelligence agency in Peshawar.
The heavily barricaded compound with its steel barrier and its guards were no match for the determination of a suicide bomber driving a mini-truck with 300 kilograms of explosives. The three-story U-shaped building was devastated, 18 people killed and many others maimed. One might think that a Muslim country living in a perpetual state of violent disarray stemming from its incessant antagonistic volleys both diplomat-verbal and violently militant, might know better than to ally itself with those more fanatical than themselves.
The violent rancour the government had incurred when it suddenly revoked support for fanatic jihad has come back to haunt it. The incendiary bomb of hatred that it had itself lit has it now struggling for its own existence. There is no possible accommodation that a nation envisioning itself as a modern Muslim, secular-governed country can make with a jihad-dedicated extremist ideology determined to give no quarter to its perceived enemies.
Nor does such an Islamist-jihadi-dedicated force wish for any to be proffered to itself, in its triumph-intoxicated religious ecstasy. The agony of Pakistan, should it somehow be only partially successful in its tardy response to the Pakistani Taliban movement with its military offensive in South Waziristan, will be as nothing to the region should a a domino-effect result that could see the advance of militant Islam spreading its tentacles with confidence.
Labels: Crisis Politics, Religion, Terrorism, World Crises
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