Escaping Nightmares

Perilously deadly viruses and bacteria held in laboratory situations for the purpose of scientific study, to understand, in case of an outbreak within a population, how health authorities with the assistance of their biological-agent scientists may best deal with these deadly outbreaks, present a real problem.

How to ensure that laboratory protocol is sufficiently tight that those working within the precincts of the laboratories do not become infected, do not carry bacterium out of the laboratory with them by accident; in short ensuring that deadly plagues do not infect society at large.

Bio-security is paramount, right up there next to the kinds of lock-safe security required around nuclear facilities to ensure that the ingredients to spread horror, terror and death at the hands of terrorists does not occur. Because there is that potential.

And because terrorists care nothing for human life, and seek to instill terror where they may, regardless of the cost, to fulfill their obligations to their deadly agendas of fomenting fear and violence.

When the Soviet Union dissolved and Russia was faced with the very real problem of how to deal with their crumbling nuclear facilities, and the international community was highly concerned with the very real prospect of rogue scientists responding to lavish compensation offers for their services, or laboratory workers succumbing to the allure of selling fissionable material to the highest bidder, this represented a period of great suspense and concern.

It still does, but other countries of the world have helped Russia to fortify its defences against illegal and dangerous seepage of materials and instruments, fuel and intelligence to agents that would present as a threat to the world at large. Similarly, high-level bio-security laboratories in places like Kyrgyzstan, once part of the Soviet Union, and still hosting lethal pathogens developed for the prospect for prosecuting biological warfare during the Cold War, presents as a real and present danger in their lack of physical security.

These facilities house anthrax, plague, cholera, brucella and hemorrhagic fever agents. Across this central Asian nation there are occasional outbreaks of these deadly diseases. The laboratories function as a central storage and research facility to cope with outbreaks. The scientists working in such labs are knowledgeable and capable, and atrociously underpaid. Leaving them prime targets to advantage terrorists for those susceptible to bribes.

The G-8 nations have long funded programs to ameliorate the situation, by boosting incomes, by assisting in managing security deficits and helping to safeguard these potential weapons of mass destruction. Re-directing the possibilities inherent in a situation where deadly pathogens are insufficiently guarded against outbreaks, helping the country and its scientists utilize laboratories for peaceful purposes; public health and agricultural research.

The very fact that these deadly pathogens were housed in facilities whose fences have collapsed, where doors sport broken locks, and windows with no glass and no bars, surrounded by trees and foliage sheltering possible intruders from detection is enough to make anyone shudder. The scientists who work in those laboratories do so without proper protective equipment and suiting.

This represents yet another instance where wealthy industrialized countries are forced by circumstances that could infringe on their own safety and security, to extend themselves to assist less developed and wealthy countries to better manage the potentially explosive facilities they have been left with after the collapse of one of the world's former two superpowers.