Arresting Terror

Britain assigned its Intelligence and Security Committee to the task of investigating whether the 7/7 bombings in the transportation system - that so devastated the country killing 52 people and injuring hundreds of others, the work of four dedicated suicide bombers - could have been apprehended. Several of the jihadists were under scrutiny by Britain's intelligence agencies. Those who plotted to successfully carry out the attack were also in communication with other British terrorists and by extension Canada's own now-judged-and-sentenced Momin Khawaja.

There have been other attempted suicide bombings since 7/7, several carried out by medical doctors who had arrived in Britain to study and to practise medicine, while in the country on visitors' visas. And another named Operation Crevice which had been successfully apprehended. The primal fear of other suicide attacks as successful as the 7/7 bombings kept MI5 on its toes, desperate to ensure that Britain would not be as vulnerable to attack as it was then, in July 2005.

The British forensic analysis appears to offer the insight that a) intelligence is not perfect and cannot connect every dot to prevent every attack; b) be careful what you wish for. Democracies don't aspire to become the equivalent of the STASI. Which might seem to be occurring if thousands of intelligence officers were sent off helter-skelter in every direction desperate to prevent terrorist attacks. There have been some embarrassments in commission, there.

Which brings us to Ottawa's Mohamed Harkat, an Algerian living in Canada whom the government would dearly like to deport back to his home country, on suspicion of his being linked to terrorists, as a 'sleeper agent'. CSIS, Canada's spy agency, has been accused by a Federal Court judge of withholding required evidence in this man's case. The agency's credibility has been placed in suspicion of skepticism.

This is another one of those security-certificate cases that has brought an admonishing finger of legal entitlements against Canada's CSIS. The RCMP has not been exempt from criticism in similar matters of attempting to protect the security of the country and its citizens and treading outside the bounds of what is deemed to be just behaviour to do so. Forgotten in the melee of criticism is the environment post-9/11 and the attacks in Spain, Indonesia and Britain, not to speak of the arrest of Canadians aspiring to jihad.

CSIS claims to have credible circumstantial and informant-evidence that Mohamed Harkat is just what they claim him to be. New allegations have been brought to the fore, that despite his denial of having any business dealings with Ahmed Said Khadr, he worked closely with him, in Canada and in Pakistan. That Mr. Harkat trained in Pakistan as a jihadist, that he ran a safe-house for terrorists in training, and that he effected their transit.

Considering the status of the world community in desperately attempting to combat terrorism, and the very real threats emanating from al-Qaeda toward Western targets, inclusive of Canada specifically, along with the emergence of young Canadian men of foreign heritage attracted to the prospect of jihad, there is real reason for concern. The alternative is to sit back, do nothing and hope for the best.

This is not what we tax our lawmakers to do on our behalf, and it does not reflect the trust that we place in those professionals who are trained to act to protect Canadian institutions and the Canadian population. There are times when it is preferable to err on the side of caution, and times when to do so is to invite disaster. Finding one's tenuous way between the two in the spirit of observing human rights is no easy matter.